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1.  Don Fullerton 
Inputs to Tax Policy-Making: The Supply-side, the 
Deficit, and the Level Playing Field 
Thousands of  issues swirled in the whirlwind of  tax policy-making in the 
Reagan era, and any effort to sort them out must inevitably be hampered by 
differences in perspective on their relative importance, their impacts, and even 
their definitions. Taxonomy and classifications can differ. After some reflec- 
tion, however, it seems to me that most of the important issues can be catego- 
rized into three major forces that shaped the making of tax policy during the 
decade. 
Financial support was provided by a grant from the Olin Foundation to the National Bureau of 
Economic Research. This paper would not have been possible without the generous time for inter- 
views and comments provided by busy former and current policymakers such as J. Gregory Bal- 
lentine (deputy assistant secretary for tax analysis, Treasury Department, 1981-83,  and associate 
director, Office of Management and Budget, 1983-83, David Brockway (chief of staff, Joint Tax 
Committee, 1983-87), Buck Chapoton (assistant secretary for tax policy, Treasury Department, 
1981-84), Martin Feldstein (chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, 1982-84),  Represen- 
tative Willis D. Gradison, Jr. (member, Committee on Ways and Means, 1975-1992), Larry Lind- 
sey (associate director for domestic polic~  the White House, 1989-1991),  Mark McConaghy 
(chief of  staff, Joint Tax Committee, 1981-83),  Ronald A. Pearlman (assistant secretary for tax 
policy, Treasury Department, 1984-86,  and chief of staff, Joint lhx Committee, 1987-1990), John 
Salmon (chief counsel, Committee on Ways and Means, 1981-84),  Emil Sunley (deputy assistant 
secretary for tax analysis, Treasury Department, 1977-81).  Randy Weiss (deputy chief of  staff, 
Joint Tax  Committee, 1983-88),  and Jim Wetzler (deputy chief of  staff, Joint Tax  Committee, 
1979-83).  The author is also grateful for helpful suggestions from Larry Dildine, Drew Lyon, 
Charles McLure, Joe Minarik, and Jon Skinner. The research reported here is part of the NBER’s 
research program in taxation. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not those of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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First, tax policy in the 1980s was profoundly affected by the “supply-side” 
view popularized in the late 1970s by Arthur Laffer, Jude Wanniski, and Repre- 
sentative Jack Kemp. They pointed out that high personal marginal tax rates 
encourage taxpayers to stay home from work, enter the cash or barter economy, 
engage in tax shelters, or rearrange financial affairs to avoid paying tax. A 
reduction in the rate of tax would then have feedback effects that increase the 
tax base and mitigate the fall in revenue. Some define supply-side by the view 
that tax rate reductions have these advantageous feedback effects, and others 
define it by the extreme view that the tax base rises by more than the tax rate 
falls. In the latter case, the government could actually collect more revenue by 
lowering the rate of tax (see the papers in Meyer 1981). Whatever its definition, 
however, the supply-side clearly propelled policymakers into the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of  1981 as well as the additional marginal rate reduction of 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
Second, the 1980s have been characterized by persistent large government 
deficits. Some point to the large tax cuts of 1981 as the “cause” of these defi- 
cits, while others condemn the failure to reduce spending. Whatever “caused” 
these persistent government deficits, however, they undoubtedly reshaped the 
making of tax policy after 1981. Up to this point, inflation in an unindexed 
tax system continually pushed taxpayers into higher brackets, increased real 
revenues automatically, and allowed Congress to enact successive tax “reduc- 
tion” legislation. Tax  policymakers simply did not have to worry about ob- 
taining enough revenue (see, e.g., McLure 1990a). I will emphasize the impor- 
tance of the indexing provisions of the 1981 act as the beginning of an era that 
instead has a perennial shortfall in revenue. The current process of tax policy- 
making is very different because of it. 
Third, although I appeal to a rather broad definition, the level playing field 
evolved during this period to encompass notions of  fairness, economic effi- 
ciency, and even simplicity. Some companies and individuals were observed to 
pay high effective tax rates, while others with the same income paid little or 
no tax at all. Economists pointed to these differences as a source of resource 
misallocation and economic inefficiency in production, a view that I call the 
efJiciency version of the level playing field. Others simply viewed these differ- 
ences as unfair, a view that I call the equity version of the level playing field. 
This view relates to horizontal  equity, the equal treatment of  those with the 
same income, in contrast to the vertical equity treatment of those with different 
incomes. Under either version of the level playing field, there was growing 
support for the idea that government should get out of the business of deciding 
which investments are most productive. This idea was certainly voiced earlier, 
but not until the 1980s was it assimilated, digested, and accepted.’ It became a 
driving force in the tax increases of 1982-84,  the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and 
beyond. (See, e.g., The President’s Tax Proposals 1985.) 
1. See the papers in the Summer 1987 issue of the Journal ojEconomic Perspectives. 167  Tax Policy 
1 organize discussion around these three headings primarily because, as I 
will argue, they were wholly new forces in the field of  tax policy-making. 
Certainly, other perennial issues were important during this period as well, and 
I take this opportunity to note topics not covered in this paper. Since I empha- 
size the domestic economy, readers interested primarily in foreign repercus- 
sions should see Grubert and Mutti (1987) or McLure (1990b). Those inter- 
ested in the politics of tax reform should see Witte (1985), Stewart (1991), or 
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam (1990). For the effects of the budget process on 
tax policy, see Rudder (1983) or Merrill, Collender, and Cook (1990). On is- 
sues of complexity, see McLure (1990a). 
Also, since I emphasize the economic thinking of policymakers during de- 
bates about proposals, I do not discuss the actual effects of tax changes. For 
the effects of the 1981 act on the distribution of tax burdens, see U.S. Congres- 
sional Budget Office (1987), U.S. House of Representatives (1990), and Lind- 
sey (1990). For many other economic effects of the 1986 act, see U.S. Depart- 
ment of the Treasury (1987) and all the papers in Slemrod (1990). 
Details of the tax laws themselves can be found in various publications of 
the U.S. Congress and the Commerce Clearing House. Details of the arduous 
process toward just one piece of legislation, the  1986 act, can be found in 
Birnbaum and Murray (1987) and Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam (1990). Since 
this one chapter must cover legislation throughout the 198Os, it cannot do jus- 
tice to these details. Instead, I will discuss selected issues, especially as they 
relate to the supply-side, the deficit, and the level playing field. Primarily, how- 
ever, I will argue that it is most unusual to have the phenomenon of three such 
wholly novel developments shaping policy in one decade. 
3.1  Some Relevant Background 
To  imagine the debate around the turn of the century about the proposed 
Sixteenth Amendment’s direct tax on incomes, one only need consider the cur- 
rent debate about a possible tax on value added: the new tax would be a power- 
ful source of revenue even at low rates and might allow considerable growth 
of government if  imposed at higher rates. Table 3.1 outlines a history of just 
the top marginal income tax rate, the additional tax paid if a person in the 
highest income bracket were to earn one more dollar. This top rate starts at 
only 7 and then 15 percent, but it jumps significantly at the First World War 
and again near the Second World War. Remarkably, the table shows that the 
top personal marginal tax rate from 1944 until 1964 was over 90 percent. 
Since this paper is supposed to discuss what prompted tax policy changes 
since 1980, it will address the specific question, What prompted the dramatic 
reduction in personal marginal tax rates from a top 70 percent rate in 1980 to 
a top 33 percent rate by  1988? One easy, and probably correct, answer is to 
point out the increasing popularity around 1980 of the supply-side view that 
high marginal tax rates can stifle incentives to work and invest. This review of 168  Don Fullerton 
Years  Top Rate (%)  Years  Top Rate (%) 
1913-15  7 
1916  15 
1917  67 
1918  77 
1919-2 1  73 
1922-23  58 
1925-31  25 
1932-35  63 
1936-39  79 
1940-4 1  81 
1942-43  88 

























Source: Tax Foundation (1988, table C36). For some surcharges and special rules, see the notes 
to Tax Foundation (1988). 
Nore: From 1944 to  1963, when the top marginal rate exceeded 90 percent, maximum effective 
rate limitations kept the total tax as a fraction of taxable income (the average tax) below 90 percent. 
This cap varied between 77 percent (1948-49)  and 88 percent (1952-53). Also, these top bracket 
rates include surcharges of 7.5 percent in 1968, 10 percent in 1969, and 2.5 percent in 1970. They 
exclude the minimum tax (enacted in 1969) and the 50 percent maximum rate on earned income 
(enacted in 1971). 
prior history, however, turns the question on its head. The inverted question is 
much more difficult, and perhaps unanswerable. What in the world prompted 
tax policymakers during the twenty-year period from 1944 until 1964 to enact 
personal marginal tax rates over 90 percent? 
For two reasons, the top rate is a misleading indicator of the overall impact 
of the tax. First, the revenue impact of the income tax depends much more on 
the taxation of  middle brackets than on the taxation of just the top bracket. 
Pechman (1987, 375) shows that 96.7 percent of tax returns in 1980 (paying 
68.7 percent of the tax) were in brackets below $50,000 of adjusted gross in- 
come. Second, the link between rates and revenues is broken by exemptions, 
deductions, and a host of special provisions. Pechman estimates that "in  1947 
only about 40 percent of personal income was subject to tax; this rose to 50 
percent in 1969 and then declined to 45-47  percent between 1971 and 1984" 
(p. 66). For both these reasons, the total federal individual income tax after 
1947 was  never more than  11.3 percent of  personal income, a high that it 
reached in 1981. 
Table 3.2 shows more detailed information about the personal income tax 
between 1947 and 1985. The first column repeats the top bracket rate, from 
table 3.1 above, and the second column shows the tax as a percentage of per- 
sonal income. For the years shown, this ratio hit a low of 7.0 percent in 1949, 
rose to 10.2  percent in 1952, and fell below that level for the next fifteen years. 
It then reached highs of 11.2 in 1969 and 11.3 in 1981. The third column shows 169  Tax Policy 
Table 3.2  Personal Income Tax Rates and Revenues 
Top Bracket  Tax as % of  Tax as % of 





























































































































































Source: Pechman (1987,313-14,346,370)  and Steuerle and Hartzmark (1981,  160). 
Note:  From 1944 to 1963, when the top marginal rate exceeded 90  percent, maximum effective 
rate limitations  kept the total tax  as  a fraction of taxable income (the average tax)  below 90 percent. 
This cap varied between 77 percent (1948-49)  and 88 percent (1952-53).  Also, these top bracket 
rates include surcharges  of 7.5  percent in 1968, 10 percent in 1969, and 2.5 percent in 1970. They 
exclude the minimum tax (enacted in 1969) and the 50 percent maximum rate on earned income 
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the personal income tax as a percentage of total federal receipts. For virtually 
all the years shown, this fraction varied only between 41 and 48 percent, reach- 
ing its high in 1982. The relative stability of the personal tax, however, masks 
the falling corporate tax share and the rising payroll tax share of  federal re- 
ceipts. 
Thus, the top 90 percent personal rate was perhaps not viewed as such a 
problem: it was good for the perception that rich people paid plenty of tax, but 
less than one-tenth of 1 percent of taxpayers ever had to pay at that rate. Virtu- 
ally anyone with that much income would be doing something to avoid that 
bracket. With the benefit of hindsight, however, this logic dovetails perfectly 
with the supply-side view that high rates are counterproductive by  inducing 
changes in behavior. Incentives clearly were stifled for those allowed to keep 
less than a dime out of a dollar’s extra effort. In particular, Ronald Reagan tells 
of making movies during this period with over a 90 percent top bracket: “So 
we all quit working after four pictures and went off to the country” (Stockman 
1987, 11). The perceived success of the Kennedy-Johnson cut in the top rate 
from 91 to 70 percent in 1964 was a major factor in the subsequent effort in 
1980 to cut the top rate to 50 percent. 
Another important feature of the prior tax code was that inflation and not 
just real growth would push poor households onto the tax roles and middle- 
income taxpayers into higher brackets. Minarik (1985, 37) shows that, from 
1965 to 1980, the marginal rate on a family with the median income increased 
from 17 to 24 percent while that on a family with twice the median income 
increased from 22 to 43 percent. Inflation did not increase the marginal rate of 
those already in the top bracket, but it did increase their tax as a fraction of 
income (see Steuerle and Hartzmark  1981). As a result, legislators always 
seemed to find themselves with surplus revenue that could be used for some 
combination of increased spending or decreased taxes: “In the seven-year pe- 
riod from 1975 through 1981, eight of the eleven major revenue measures (73 
percent) enacted by Congress were estimated by the Treasury Department to 
lose revenues in the first three fiscal years after enactment, with an average 
revenue loss of $27 billion” (Memll, Collender, and Cook 1990, 37). 
Very little rate reduction occurred from 1965 to 1980, so the primary form 
of tax reduction was through additional credits or deductions. Special Analysis 
G of the U.S. Budget documents the growth of “tax expenditures,” the revenues 
lost from special tax provisions that might have been direct expenditures in- 
stead. Without these tax expenditures, personal tax revenues would have been 
50 percent higher in 1974, almost twice as high in 1984, and over twice as high 
in  1986. Tax  expenditures sometimes exceeded 45 percent of direct federal 
outlays (but the 1986 act cut them to 34 percent of those outlays). 
This is not to say that the government often had a surplus, for the money 
was most often spent or returned to taxpayers before it was ever collected. The 
point is that revenues were always projected to rise until a future year in which 
a surplus was expected. Table 3.3 shows, from 1976 to 1989, the deficit or 171  Tax Policy 
Table 3.3  CBO Baseline Budget Deficit (-)  or Surplus (+) for Fiscal Years, as 
a Percentage of GNP 
Report  Prior  Current  First  Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth 
Date  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year 
~  ~~ 
197e.c  -2.9  -4.7  -2.8  -1.6  1.6  1.8  1.8 
1977’  -3.9  -2.8  -2.2  -  .7  .5  1.7  2.7 
1978’  N.A.  N.A.  -  1.7  -  .4  .9  2.0  2.8 
1  979d  -2.4  -  1.8  -  1.9  -1.1  .2  1.2  2.4 
1980  -1.2  -1.8  -  .8  -  .6  .O  .O  .1 
1981bd  -2.2  -2.1  -2.2  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
1982  -2.7  -4.2  -5.1  -  5.4  -5.4  -5.6  -5.4 
1983  -4.2  -6.6  -6.1  -6.0  -6.0  -6.0  -5.9 
1984  -6.4  -5.7  -5.3  -5.4  -5.7  -5.9  -6.3 
1985  -5.2  -5.6  -5.2  -5.2  -5.1  -5.2  -5.3 
1986  -5.4  -5.0  -4.0  -3.4  -2.8  -2.1  -1.7 
1987  -5.3  -4.0  -3.6  -3.2  -2.5  -1.9  -1.4 
1988  -3.4  -3.4  -3.5  -3.1  -2.8  -2.5  -2.1 
1989  -3.2  -3.0  -2.6  -2.4  -2.2  -2.0  -1.7 
Source: Memll, Collender, and Cook (1990). For their source, Memll et al. refer to various issues 
of the CBO’s Economic and Budget Ourlook. Total deficit includes off-budget items. 
Note: NA = not available. 
”Average  of path A and B forecasts (5 and 6 percent GNP growth assumptions). 
Talendar year 1981-82  GNF’  estimated as average of published range. 
‘Fiscal  year GNP estimated as 25 percent of prior and 75 percent of future calendar year GNP 
forecasts (50 percent of prior and future calendar years used for fiscal year 1976). 
dCalculated  by subtracting outlays from revenues, both as a percentage of GNP. 
surplus from the past year and the current year and the projected deficit or 
surplus for the next five years. In the late 1970s, the current deficit was always 
projected to turn into a surplus within those five years. The quote given above 
makes clear that a tax reduction such as the 1981 act was not necessarily un- 
usual, except perhaps for the extent of the rate cut. The act included indexing 
after 1985, however, so that inflation would no longer push taxpayers into 
higher brackets. The result is a fundamental shift in the nature of the policy 
problem, as shown in table 3.3: after 1981, the budget is always projected to 
remain in deficit. Until the row for 1986 (the 1987-91  projection), those defi- 
cits were even expected to rise as a fraction of GNP. As a consequence, “in the 
following seven years of  1982 through 1988, fourteen of the seventeen major 
revenue measures (82 percent) were estimated to raise revenue in the first three 
years after enactment, with an average revenue gain of $15 billion” (Merrill, 
Collender, and Cook 1990,37). Thus, 1981 represents a watershed year in the 
making of tax policy, from an era of constantly projected surpluses to one of 
constantly projected deficits. As discussed below, the making of tax policy 
would never be the same. 
Policymakers used the excess revenue during the postwar period, not just to 172  Don Fullerton 
offset bracket creep in the personal tax system, but to provide additional  invest- 
ment incentives in the corporate tax system. In 1954, Congress first introduced 
accelerated methods of depreciation such as double-declining-balance  or sum- 
of-the-years’-digits. Then, in  1962, the Treasury issued “Guidelines” with a 
30-40  percent shortening of  previously suggested Bulletin F lives, and the 
Congress enacted the first investment tax credit (ITC) for equipment. In 1971, 
the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) permitted a 20 percent reduction from 
the Guideline lifetimes. Some acceleration was perhaps intended to offset the 
reduction in real allowances caused by increasing inflation, but still the corpo- 
rate income tax fell from 30.3 percent of federal revenue in 1954 to 12.5 per- 
cent in 1980. The 1981 act further reduced depreciation lifetimes with the Ac- 
celerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS), and the corporate income tax fell to 
10,  8, and 6 percent of federal revenues in  1981, 82, and 83, respectively 
(Pechman 1987,370).*  Thus, the postwar period reflects a falling ratio of ob- 
served corporate taxes to profits, or the “average effective tax rate,” from 51 
percent in 1960 to 24 percent in 1985 (Auerbach and Poterba 1987,6). 
A more forward-looking  measure of investment incentives is the “marginal 
effective tax rate,” the ratio of expected future taxes to expected future income 
from a hypothetical marginal investment. One such measure, shown in the bot- 
tom row of table 3.4, fell from 48 percent under 1960 law, to 37 percent under 
1980 law, to 26 percent under the 1981 act. This measure includes all taxes on 
the expected income from the investment, such as corporate taxes, property 
taxes, and personal income taxes. However, other calculations from King and 
Fullerton (1984) indicate that the effective rate from just property taxes and 
personal taxes in  1981 would be 35 percent. In other words, the corporate tax 
system under 1981 law provides a net subsidy in the sense that its elimination 
would cause an increase in this total effective tax rate from 26 to 35 percent. 
This subsidy results from the combination of accelerated depreciation, the in- 
vestment tax credit, and interest deductions at a statutory corporate rate that 
exceeds the average of  the rates at which recipients are  taxes on interest 
in~ome.~ 
Of course, this subsidy is not uniform across all investments of all firms, and 
therein lies an important problem. The 1960 calculations, before the invest- 
ment tax credit was enacted, show effective tax rates of 59 percent for equip- 
ment and 45 percent for buildings or inventories. By 1980, with the ITC, these 
were 18  percent for machinery, 41  percent for buildings and 47 percent for 
inventories. In the calculations  of King and Fullerton (1984,252) for just prop- 
2. Note that  the  1981 act did not reduce the statutory corporate tax rate. Also, Auerbach and 
Poterba (1987) show that accelerated depreciation and other legislated changes account for less 
than half the decline in corporate tax revenues since the mid-1960s while reduced profitability and 
other factors account for the rest. 
3. King and Fullerton (1984) also show how inflation raises this effective tax rate through depre- 
ciation allowances based on historical cost and through taxation of nominal capital gains and 
lowers the effective tax rate through deductions for nominal interest at a rate  that  exceeds the 
average rate of recipients. The net effect of inflation is mixed. 173  Tax Policy 
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Source: King and Fullerton (1984,244,255, and 261). Column 4 is from Fullerton and Karayannis 
(1993). Calculations assume a 10 percent pretax rate of return, a 6.77 percent rate of  inflation, and 
sufficient tax liability for the firm to use all available credits and deductions. These rates include 
the net effect of  all corporate taxes, property taxes, and personal taxes on the income from a 
marginal investment in the corporate sector. 
erty taxes and personal taxes in  1980, the effective rate for machinery is 34 
percent. Thus, even by  1980, the corporate tax system was providing a net 
subsidy for machinery. Under the fully phased-in version of the 1981 act, as- 
suming enough tax liability that all credits and deductions could be used, the 
total effective tax rate on machinery was a negative 5.5 percent (table 3.4). The 
corporate subsidy was so large that it more than offset positive property taxes 
and personal taxes on corporate-source  income? 
As discussed more fully below, the 1981 act was intended to provide more 
investment incentives for capital formation that, in turn,  would enhance future 
productivity. The familiar course for such incentives was to apply them primar- 
ily to equipment. But the 1981 act carried this logic to such an extreme that 
the effective tax rate on machinery was  -5.5  percent, the rate on buildings 
was +30 percent, and that on inventories or land was still +47 percent. Aver- 
aged over these assets, as shown in table 3.4, an investment financed by new 
share issues faced a marginal effective tax rate of  +85  percent, and one fi- 
nanced by  debt faced  -32  percent. As  a  consequence, some equipment- 
4. Even if  the firm did not have enough tax liability to use all credits itself, the “safe-harbor 
leasing” feature of  the 1981 law allowed it to lease equipment from another firm that could use 
the credit, at a rental price that passed through the benefit of the credit. 174  Don Fullerton 
intensive or debt-intensive firms were paying little or no tax in the early 1980s, 
while other firms such as retailers were paying high effective tax rates.5 
Many economists  pointed out that these differences would lead to misalloca- 
tions of resources and a lower value of output than if the same amount of tax 
were collected in a more uniform manner. Others simply thought it unfair that 
some firms with positive income were paying no tax.  These investment incen- 
tives were the building blocks of tax shelters, and they were sometimes used 
by high-income firms and individuals  to avoid paying any tax at all. Calls were 
heard for a “level playing field” that would subject all firms and all types of 
investment to more similar effective tax rates. The development and impact of 
such ideas will be examined below. 
3.2  The Supply-side 
It was 1974 when Arthur Laffer first drew his famous curve on a napkin in 
a Washington restaurant6 Its logic is amazingly simple. Government revenue 
must be zero at a tax rate of 0 percent, and revenue must also be zero at a tax 
rate of  100 percent since nobody would bother to work or earn other forms of 
income subject to tax. If any revenue is raised between tax rates of 0 and 100 
percent, there must be an intermediate rate at which revenue is maximized. 
The counterintuitive  implication is that there must also be a range over which 
a higher tax rate reduces revenue. Even more surprising, perhaps, is that this 
result was not already well known and well understood by everyone interested 
in tax policy. 
The principle economic reason given for this result was that taxpayers react 
by  changing their supply of  taxable labor or capital, a terminology that was 
useful in  distinguishing this microeconomic orientation from the previous 
macroeconomic orientation of  tax cuts designed to stimulate aggregate de- 
mand. To academic economists, however, the presentation of  the idea had a 
number of  problems. First, of  course, the idea was not exactly new: “High 
taxes, sometimes by diminishing the consumption of the taxed commodities, 
and sometimes by encouraging smuggling, frequently afford a smaller revenue 
to government than what might be drawn from more moderate taxes” (Adam 
Smith [1776] 1975, bk. 5, chap. 2).  Second, economists were quite familiar 
5. If the corporate investment is financed by  stocks and bonds sold to a tax-exempt institution, 
the total effective rate in table 3.4 is -37  percent.  Presuming that the corporation can use all 
excess credits and deductions on the marginal investment against its tax liability on intramarginal 
investments, the positive corporate tax is more than offset by  the ITC, accelerated depreciation 
allowances, and interest deductions at the statutory corporate rate, with no subsequent tax on the 
exempt recipient of  the interest and dividends. 
6. “Dining with Wanniski and Richard Cheney, Rumsfeld’s deputy, Laffer tried to explain how 
higher tax rates can produce less revenue. . . .  When Cheney seem mystified, Laffer impulsively 
grabbed a napkin and drew a curve, demonstrating  the variable relationship  between tax rates and 
revenues. Thus  was born what Wanniski popularized in his writings as the Laffer Curve” (Evans 
and Novak 1981,63). 175  Tax Policy 
with the idea that economic outcomes were determined by the interaction of 
both supply and demand. Third, Laffer and other early champions did not just 
point out the existence of  the downward-sloping range of the curve but also 
claimed that “we are well within this range at present” (Laffer 1977, 79). 
Fourth, they emphasized the effect of lower tax rates on actual labor and capital 
supply, at least initially:  rather than on financial arrangements and other tax 
avoidance behavior that can be used to reduce one’s tax base.8 
An unfortunate result was that these surface issues were easily attacked. It 
was quickly shown that the curve did indeed exist within preexisting economic 
models with both demand and supply behavior but that “reasonable estimates 
of an aggregate labor supply elasticity and of an overall marginal tax rate are 
both low enough to suggest that broad-based cuts in labor tax rates would not 
increase revenues” (Fullerton 1982, 20). Use of this preexisting model found 
that the revenue-maximizing tax rate was in the 70-80  percent range. Such 
responses address the extreme claims, perhaps, but not the more subtle and 
important points of  the supply-side movement. What we learned ultimately 
from this movement is that tax rate reductions may have large effects on the 
tax base through means other than actual labor or capital  upp ply.^ 
Indeed, the quote from Adam Smith should be suggestive. ?1yo hundred 
years ago, when most government revenue was obtained from tariffs, a particu- 
larly high rate would not necessarily discourage imports; it would just shift 
them to an untaxed form. Similarly, high rates of tax may do little to actual 
labor supply, but they may shift it to an untaxed form such as “receiving in- 
come as fringe benefits, devoting expenditures to tax deductible items, and 
participating in the underground economy” (Browning 1989, 52). Use of  a 
model with these three behaviors found that the revenue-maximizing tax rate 
was in the 50-60  percent range. 
Tax  avoidance can take additional forms as well. In 1985, the president’s 
Council of Economic Advisers called for lower marginal tax rates that would 
reduce the incentive to hold tax-free municipal bonds, to take advantage of the 
deductibility of state and local taxes by shifting more activity into that govern- 
7. Representative Jack Kemp, e.g., said, “The case that I’m making is that this tax system is 
biased against innovation, against investment, against savings, against work. There’s such a tax on 
labor and capital that it’s causing in part the deficit” (New  York  Times,  30 November 1980). 
8. In addition, some of the initial  jargon was simply wrong, suggesting  that the peak of the curve 
is “the point at which the electorate desires to  be taxed‘’ and where “revenues plus production are 
maximized” (Wanniski 1978,98). 
9. Another lesson from more recent literature is that the effect of a tax rate change depends 
greatly on what is done with the revenue. If extra revenue is used to provide cash or the equivalent 
back to taxpayers, then work effort necessarily falls. The taxpayer does not really lose any income, 
so the change in relative price makes him substitute from work into leisure. True supply-siders 
believe that most government programs do provide cash or private goods. Instead, however, the 
revenue may  be spent on something that bears no relation to choices about private goods and 
leisure (where economists say that the public good is “separable” in utility). The relative price of 
leisure falls, so the substitution effect makes an individual work less, but he has less income to 
spend on private goods and leisure, so the income effect makes him work more. On net, labor may 
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ment sector, to take business deductions for travel, meals, and entertainment, 
to use fringe benefits as a form of compensation, to take deductible charitable 
contributions, to use interest-deductible debt rather than equity to finance an 
investment, to earn tax-free “imputed” net rents from owner-occupied  housing, 
to search out legal tax shelters, and to engage in illegal tax evasion (see U.S. 
Council of Economic Advisers 1985). 
After some rate reduction was completed, Lindsey (1990) found that tax 
cuts for lower brackets had positive feedback effects on revenue but did not 
pay for themselves. However, he found that high-bracket taxpayers (those earn- 
ing more than $200,000) brought so much more activity into the tax base that 
they ended up paying more tax rather than less. In other words, the use of his 
model found that the revenue-maximizing tax rate was in the 40-50  percent 
range. 
For these reasons, and with the value of hindsight, it might be said that the 
supply-side  movement was entirely mislabeled. This terminology emphasizes 
actual labor supply, which for most people is not very adjustable, and it thus 
gave traditional thinkers an easy target. Supply-siders  were branded as extrem- 
ists even before they got a chance to list these other more adjustable behaviors 
as additional reasons that a tax cut could raise revenue. Moreover, the supply- 
side label did not convey their more central message, namely, that economic 
growth would be aided by shrinking the size of government. 
It did not help that the supply-siders themselves were ambiguous. In intel- 
lectual circles, they tried to explain the myriad ways in which rate reduction 
can have positive feedback effects on revenue, but, in the popular press, these 
complex arguments always seemed to get reduced to the claim that people 
work more and revenues rise. Others besides Laffer and Wanniski helped feed 
this misunderstanding, partly in order to bring attention to their cause. A 
“wake-up call” was needed to put the issue before the people and convince 
policymakers that taxes had any such incentive effects at all. Jack Kemp was 
quoted as saying, “Frankly, it is my belief that at lower, more efficient rates of 
taxation, we’ll get more revenue” (New  York Times, 30 November 1980), and 
candidate Reagan said, “Even the government winds up getting more money 
at the lower rates.”1o  As Murray Weidenbaum (1988, 19) wrote, “Supply-side 
economics has made a useful positive contribution in moving the issue of in- 
centives . . .  to the front page of our newspapers.” The problem with this ambi- 
guity was that then they had to deal with the consequences: 
Journalists and academics continued to declare that there was not a scrap 
of  evidence for supply-side economics. When pressed on  this matter of 
evidence, it always turned out that they meant there was no evidence that 
tax-rate reductions would pay  for themselves in each bracket. Since Rea- 
ganomics was not based on the Laffer Curve, they either did not know what 
10. This quote was used on a 1981 broadcast of “All Things Considered,” on National Public 
Radio, entitled “Tax  Less, Work More” (no. 8131 1). 177  Tax Policy 
they were criticizing or pretended not to know in order to hold on to their 
strawman. (Roberts 1984, 133) 
As noted above, the cut in the top rate might have paid for itself, but not across- 
the-board cuts in all marginal rate brackets. 
These problems with the initial presentation of supply-side ideas may have 
been the source of weak academic support, but problems with inflation were 
definitely the source of strong public support. Increases in the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) were substantial: 
Year  %ChangeCPI  I  Year  % Change CPI 
1976  5.8 
1977  6.5 
1978  7.6 
1979  11.3  1  1980  13.5 
Source: U.S. Council of Economic Advisers (1990,363). 
In fact, inflation was a factor in two supply-side  precursors of 1978. In Califor- 
nia, inflation had been increasing nominal assessed values, with the result that 
property taxes would rise even with no change in the tax rate, until a popular 
uprising passed Proposition 13 to limit these automatic tax increases. In addi- 
tion, inflation had been increasing nominal selling prices and therefore taxes 
on capital gains. President Carter did not recognize the shifting political winds, 
perhaps, until a popular uprising passed the Steiger Amendment to convert his 
proposed capital gains rate increase into a capital gains rate decrease.” 
Inflation was having at least two other important effects on taxes. First, it 
was pushing taxpayers into higher brackets, increasing personal marginal tax 
rates through “bracket creep.” One response was the Kemp-Roth plan of  1977, 
H.R. 8333, also known as “10-10-10”  to summarize its three successive years 
of  10 percent cuts in all marginal tax rates. However, rate reduction would not 
offset the effect of inflation on low-income households that had become tax- 
able. Second, inflation was reducing the real value of depreciation allowances, 
increasing the cost of  capital, and decreasing investment incentives. The re- 
sponse to this problem was the Conable-Jones  plan, H.R. 4646, also known as 
“10-5-3” to summarize its three depreciation lifetime categories for all assets: 
ten years for structures, five years for equipment, and three years for light ve- 
hicles. 
These proposals each represented massive tax reductions, at least relative to 
the then current unindexed tax system that was projected to turn a 2.4 percent 
of GNP deficit into a 2.4 percent of GNP surplus  (in table 3.3 above, the row 
11. At the time, the top bracket was 70 percent, and the capital gains exclusion was 50 percent, 
but  the “alternative tax on capital gains” allowed a 25 percent  rate on the  first $50,000 of  net 
capital gains. In January,  the President’s 1978 TnxProgrurn (US.  Department of the Treasury 1978) 
proposed repealing the alternative tax and  thus raising the top capital gains rate to 35 percent. The 
enacted legislation instead raised the exclusion, to 60 percent. 178  Don Fullerton 
for 1979). Each was motivated in part by  supply-side considerations. For dif- 
ferent reasons, however, each was actually a very traditional piece of legis- 
lation. 
As described above, the entire postwar period had seen frequent income tax 
“reduction” legislation.I2  The Kemp-Roth plan was a bit larger, perhaps, and it 
provided rate reduction in contrast to the more common practice of adding new 
credits and deductions. But inflation was greater than normal, and bracket 
creep had sent marginal rates to all-time highs. Thus, despite supply-side  rhet- 
oric, even 10-10-10  could be viewed as another ad hoc offset to inflation. In 
particular, it was traditional legislation in that it did not propose indexing to 
end the continuing cycle of bracket creep and tax “reduction.” 
Similarly, as described above, depreciation had been accelerated in 1954, 
1962, and 1971. In 1980, inflation was higher than usual, so the proposed ac- 
celeration in allowances was higher than usual. Again, the Conable-Jones 10- 
5-3  plan was traditional legislation in that it did not propose to index deprecia- 
tion  allowances in  a  way  that  would  guarantee  a  certain real  value  of 
depreciation whatever the rate of  inflation. According to David  Stockman 
(1987,62), it did not even arrive with any supply-side rhetoric: “Conable and 
his Ways and Means Committee Republicans  had consolidated  their own coali- 
tion. It was an awesome assembly of business lobbies and trade associations 
representing everything from autos to real estate, steel, and zinc smelters. . . . 
The old guard was much more comfortable with this approach +an  with the 
supply-side marginal rate reduction plan.” For related reasons, this business 
tax cut did not jibe with the populist message of  the personal tax cuts: “Kemp 
and the supply-side purists did not like it, viewing it as just another tax shelter 
for established big corporations that would be little or no help to up-and- 
coming entrepreneurs, the future hope of the capitalist system who above all 
wanted a quick drop in taxation of  ‘unearned’ income” (Evans and Novak 
1981,99). 
In addition, these proposals were not designed according to any particular 
careful theory, supply-side or otherwise. There was no special reason for three 
successive 10  percent rate cuts, except that it spread out the cost, and no special 
reason for that particular total percentage cut, except that it was big. The spe- 
cial appeal was the simplicity  of the numbers, 10-10-10.  It was something  that 
the man on the street could understand. Even for an area as arcane as business 
depreciation provisions, the simplicity of 10-5-3  had appeal.13 
Thus, the proposals had several things going for them. Inflation was at an 
all-time high, the budget was projected to go into surplus, the simplicity was 
appealing, there was a popular antitax uprising, and a new supply-side theory 
12. In contrast, the postwar period also saw frequent Social Security tax increase legislation. 
13. As David Brockway pointed out to me, “10-10-10  is not something you generate out of a 
computer.” Also, “they were running out of corporate tax base, so eventually the bubble  would 
burst. . .  .  If anything is devoid of intellectual content, it’s 10-5-3.’’ 179  Tax Policy 
provided some intellectual (if ambiguous) underpinnings. For many traditional 
legislators, however, the extreme version of  the supply-side view may have 
worked against the proposal. Few in Congress gave any credence at all to the 
idea that the rate cut would pay for itself. 
The proposals had much more going for them in 1980, however, when candi- 
date Reagan came on board. Ronald Reagan was a natural opponent of high 
taxes and big government, and his campaign pushed the populist message of 
the supply-side.  He garnered populist support with 10-10-10  and courted busi- 
ness support with 10-5-3.  Despite their differences,  both these proposals were 
tax cuts, both would help offset inflation, and both were proposed by Republi- 
cans. Why choose between them? Reagan was more interested in the personal 
rate cut, but both these odd bedfellows were adopted by  the Republican plat- 
form. The landslide election of 1980 certainly appeared to be a strong mandate 
for tax reduction. 
After the election, Ronald Reagan collected into his administration several 
different kinds of appointments. The White House was dominated by moderate 
Republicans such as James Baker and Richard Darman, while the Treasury 
Department included some extreme supply-siders such as Norman Ture and 
Paul Craig Roberts. The budget director, David Stockman, was a bit of a half- 
breed. He professed to be an ardent supply-sider, but he never believed that the 
tax cuts would pay  for themselves. Rather, he believed in the importance of 
smaller government for greater productivity and economic growth. He quickly 
calculated that the cost of the two tax cuts together was “staggering” (Stock- 
man 1987, @),  but he had a two-part plan. First, since the proposal still did 
not include indexing, a few years of  inflation would help undo some of  the 
cost. Second, “the prospect of  needing well over $100 billion in domestic 
spending cuts to keep the Republican budget in equilibrium appeared more as 
an opportunity than as a roadblock” (p. 74). 
As we shall see, indexing was added to the proposal before it was passed, 
and actual spending cuts were small compared to the remaining deficit. The 
more immediate problem, however, was the administration’s February  198  1 
economic forecast: “When you  added the supply siders’ assumption of  5.2 
percent real growth [for 19821 to Weidenbaum’s 7.7 percent inflation, you got 
a mountain of money GNP-and  phantom tax revenues” (Stockman 1987, 
106-7).  Thus, it was “Rosy Scenario” who convinced policymakers that they 
could afford the big tax cut. 
Although the Senate had gone Republican in 1980, the tax cuts were still far 
from a sure thing. Many legislators viewed the size of the personal tax cut as 
irresponsible. In the first place, Democrats were naturally opposed to the tax 
and spending cuts, and, in the second place, traditional Republicans agreed 
with George Bush’s campaign quote that supply-side was “voodoo economics.” 
Both these groups were more inclined toward the business tax cuts, and Demo- 
crat Lloyd Bentsen even had his own similar accelerated depreciation scheme 
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business leaders and lobbyists but of great interest to the new president still in 
his honeymoon period. The two proposals were married in the White House, 
as corporate executives agreed to support Kemp-Roth in exchange for White 
House support of the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS), a modified 
version of Conable-Jones that reduced structure lifetimes from thirty to forty 
years to fifteen years, equipment lifetimes to five years, and light vehicles to 
three years. 
Democrats were still balking, and the White House eventually agreed to cut 
the first year of the personal rate reduction from 10 to 5 percent, delay it for a 
year, and add a couple of “ornaments” designed to attract support from particu- 
lar so~rces.’~  Many observers said afterward, however, that such compromises 
were not necessary. The Democrats were reeling not only from electoral de- 
feats but also from successive legislative defeats on Stockman’s spending cuts. 
Southern “Boll-Weevil” Democrats had formed a viable coalition with Repub- 
licans, and other Democrats were shrinking in fear of the next election. One 
insider told me that “the Republicans could have crammed in twice the cuts 
and still got the vote, but they only bit off as much as they thought they could 
chew.” When the president was shot on 30 March, anything he wanted could 
have sailed right through. The Democratic leadership promised a tax bill by 
July. 
Meanwhile, the professional tax staffs in both the Treasury Department and 
the Joint Tax Committee were analyzing the proposals, and it was soon clear 
that the combination of the investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation 
allowances would be even more generous than simply allowing businesses to 
“expense” immediately the full cost of the investment. In my interviews, these 
insiders said that they knew that the outcome would be a host of administrative 
problems related to tax shelters, the leasing of equipment, the churning of real 
estate, and corporations without enough tax liability even to make use of the 
allowable credits and deductions. Besides, in their judgment, it just seemed 
“wrong.” Among other issues, it raised the specter of providing more invest- 
ment incentive to an older taxable firm than to a struggling new high-tech firm 
that was not yet taxable. 
The Treasury had two responses. First, they designed “safe-harbor leasing” 
so that a taxable firm could buy the equipment, lease it to an untaxed firm that 
had really wanted to make the investment in the first place, and then charge a 
rent that passes the tax benefits through to the untaxed firm. The result, we 
would see later, was that many large profitable corporations could zero-out 
their tax liability, which caused significant perception problems even if these 
firms were passing through the tax advantages by receiving reduced rents for 
the equipment. Second, in June, the Treasury proposed a reduction in the gen- 
14. Up to this point, the administration was wing to keep “clean” a bill that would balance the 
budget by  1983 (using the “Rosy Scenario”).  Although these changes started them down the road 
toward a ‘‘Cllrty” bill, the cost of the ornaments was offset by the lower first-year rate cut. 181  Tax Policy 
erosity of ACRS.I5 The result in this case was “Lear-Jet Weekend.” Corporate 
executives flew to Washington from all over the country to point out that their 
support of the personal rate cuts was dependent on full White House support 
of their business tax cuts. By Monday, the full depreciation  plan was restored.16 
Along the way, the administration’s tax plan had been named after Barber 
Conable (R., New York) and Kent Hance (D., Texas). It has been amended by 
a second-earner’s deduction, an estate and gift tax reduction, a higher ceiling 
on Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), and a credit for oil royalty owners. 
But the Democrats were not just sitting on their hands. All tax legislation is 
required by the Constitution to begin in the House of Representatives, and the 
House was still controlled by the Democrats. The new chairman of the House 
Ways and Means Committee, Dan Rostenkowski, wanted to put his own stamp 
on the bill. Democrats were nervous about the third year of 10 percent personal 
rate cuts, so they came up with an alternative of their own. They saw enough 
of the supply-side argument that they viewed as sensible the cut in the top rate 
from 70 to 50 percent, so they made it immediate rather than phased over 
three years. To try to rationalize the depreciation scheme, they offered straight 
expensing of equipment. To attract particular other constituencies, they added 
significant cuts in the estate and gift tax, a larger oil royalty credit, an IRA for 
those who already have pension plans, a cut in the corporate tax rate from 46 
to 34 percent, and other sweeteners. The Republicans countered by  adding 
several of these ornaments plus additional provisions for indexing and for all- 
savers’ certificates. The result was the “bidding war” of  summer 1981 (see 
Rudder 1983; and Witte 1985). Sweeteners were added both to the administra- 
tion’s bill and to the Democratic alternative in attempts to bid support away 
from the other. The bills were fundamentally  very similar, so the struggle really 
amounted to whose name would be on the bill to win. At this point, all sem- 
blance of responsible policy-making went out the window. Several observers 
thought that the result was nothing other than a “feeding frenzy.”” 
The resulting bill, passed in August, had not just three years of personal rate 
cuts and the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS). It had safe-harbor 
leasing, expanded IRAs and Keogh accounts, all-savers’ certificates,  estate and 
gift tax cuts, a second-earner deduction, an incentive stock option, a larger 
employee stock option plan (ESOP), an oil royalty owner’s credit, a research 
and development (R&D) incremental tax credit, a child-care credit, deductions 
for charitable contributions of nonitemizers, an increase in the homeowners’ 
15. Double-declining-balance  was reduced to 150 percent declining balance, while utilities and 
industrial structures were given longer lives. 
16. Although double-declining-balance  was restored, it was delayed until  after 1985. Lives 
would be shortened immediately, but depreciation would be 150 percent of declining balance in 
1981-84,  175 percent in 1985, and 200 percent thereafter. Each depreciation schedule is laid out 
in a table, and each involves switching to straight line or sum-of-the-yeafs-digits  at the optimal 
point in the life of the asset. 
17. The logic “was that of the alcoholic: One more couldn’t hurt, given all that had gone down 
already” (Stockman 1987,248).  See also McLure (1990a). 182  Don Fullerton 
capital gains exclusion, a deduction for adoption expenses, a new exclusion of 
foreign earned income, and many other special provisions. 
To be sure, many of these proposals had been kicking around for some time 
and had good tax policy arguments supporting them. Many did not. The point 
here is not to debate the arguments for and against each provision but to note 
the process by which they were all combined in one bill. No attention was paid 
to the long-run revenue consequences of the two main provisions, let alone all 
these additional provisions. Especially given the nature of the bidding war, all 
observers thought that the bill was pure politics. There was virtually no eco- 
nomic input to the process. Stockman (1987,278) notes that “supply side the- 
ory was, well, as relevant as love at an orgy.” 
Of the professional economists I interviewed who were involved in this pro- 
cess, almost all said that economic analysis may have had an impact only on 
some small aspects of the legislation. They pointed out that certain assets were 
moved from one depreciation category to another on the basis of economic 
estimates of useful service lives. Also, safe-harbor leasing was suggested as a 
way  to provide the same economic incentives to both taxable and untaxed 
firms. And the second-earner deduction had been suggested by economist Joe 
Pechman years before as a way to lessen the perverse incentive effects of the 
marriage penalty. Here was a modest proposal that was targeted directly at the 
logic of the supply-side. Given the higher earnings of  the family’s primary 
worker, the secondary worker faced a high initial marginal tax rate and  a more 
adjustable labor supply decision. Since the second-earner deduction cuts the 
tax of just the more responsive secondary worker, it is more likely to have a 
large positive feedback effect on revenue. 
These economists all agreed with the noneconomists that the big decisions 
were pure politics, however. First of all, if  the peak of the Laffer curve were 
really as low as 40 percent, then a pure supply-side rate cut would apply only 
to the top brackets. No supply-side response would be expected from a low- 
income taxpayer’s reduction in rate from 14 to  11 percent. In addition, the 
depreciation scheme was pushed by the business lobby, while economists were 
pushing alternatives such as expensing or the “first-year-recovery”  proposal of 
Auerbach and Jorgenson (  1980).18  Moreover, the ideas that had been put for- 
ward by economists were ignored. Economists  had pushed the value-added tax 
(VAT), a proposal that spelled electoral defeat for A1 Ullman, the former chair- 
man of  the House Ways and Means Committee. Economists had pushed the 
idea of a consumed-income tax, a proposal that was ignored by all politicians 
except Gary Hart.I9 Economists had pushed the integration of corporate and 
18. Instead of indexing later depreciation allowances, this proposal would avoid the effects of 
inflation by providing a deduction in the first year of the life of each asset that would be equivalent 
in present value to real economic depreciation. 
19. Under a consumed-income tax, each taxpayer would file an  annual return that  measures 
consumption by  including all forms of income and then deducting all forms of savings. As dis- 
cussed below, a deduction for net saving means the inclusion of net borrowing. 183  Tax Policy 
personal income taxes, another idea that was totally ignored in the political 
process.*O 
Despite these arguments, I think that it is possible to take the exact opposite 
position, namely, that economic considerations  determined the big issues while 
politics decided relatively small issues such as the provisions added during the 
bidding war. These staff economists are correct that they had more impact on 
the details of this legislation than on its fundamental form. In several important 
respects, however, other economists from the academic and private sectors had 
a prior impact on the nature of the legislation. It is more difficult to see the 
indirect role of economists whose writings get sifted through colleagues and 
the media before entering the political marketplace of ideas, but these impacts 
were crucial nonetheless. 
First, whatever the validity of particular claims made at the time, the supply- 
side is inherently an economic concept. The main point of the supply-side is 
that incentives matter, and that point was ignored or forgotten as previous poli- 
tics had raised marginal tax rates to over 90 percent. It was economic ideas 
that first suggested these rates be brought back down again. The Kemp-Roth 
bill might not have been available for consideration but for supply-side eco- 
nomics. 
Second, economic analysis deals not only with incentives but also with the 
distribution of tax burdens. While incentive considerations  suggested reducing 
the top marginal tax rate, distributional considerations suggested reducing 
rates for low-income taxpayers as well. Here, economists and politicians were 
in agreement that the tax cut should not be only for high-income households. 
In fact, bracket creep had been raising the taxes of low- and middle-income 
taxpayers more than it had been raising the taxes of  those already in the top 
bracket. 
Third, many economists had been pointing out the perverse effects of infla- 
tion not only through bracket creep but also in reducing the real value of depre- 
ciation allowances, raising capital gains taxes, and exaggerating  the real effects 
of interest paid and received. Although most economists might have preferred 
to index depreciation allowances for inflation, Feldstein (1981, 38) supported 
10-5-3  by noting that, “for moderate rate of inflation and real discount rates, 
the  acceleration proposal and full indexation are quite similar.”  Much eco- 
nomic analysis was devoted to the problem of insufficient savings and invest- 
ment, and this analysis provided much impetus to the final bill’s expanded IRA, 
reduced capital gains rate, and R&D credit. Politics merely determined the 
right time to insert these provisions, some aspects of  their form, and a few 
other provisions like ESOPs. 
20. Businessmen like to talk about double taxation, but not integration. Yet Ullman wanted to 
pay  for integration by  imposing a VAT.  As David Bmkway, talking with me, remembered it, 
“Politically, this is ludicrous: impose a sales tax in order to cut tax for business. It just reflects the 
haywire political compass of the Democrats. At least the supply side had a focus.” 184  Don Fullerton 
Finally, it is an economic argument that underlies the indexation of tax 
brackets for inflation, the provision that perhaps unexpectedly turns out to have 
the biggest effect of all. 
3.3  The Deficit 
Concern about the revenue impact of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981 (ERTA) began “immediately if not sooner.” Some legislators knew even 
as they voted for the bill that it would soon have to be fixed.21  For example, on 
14 September 1981, the New York Times reported that 
Mr. Moynihan, a Democrat and New York’s senior Senator, voted for the 
Administration’s tax legislation this summer-both  in committee and on the 
Senate floor-but  maintained in an interview that he really supported only 
certain parts of that bill. He gave it his vote, he explained, “because it was 
that or nothing.” 
Asked to specify how he would revise the tax bill, Mr. Moynihan said he 
was not ready to provide details, other than to say he would cut the $750 
billion, five-year cost of the Administration’s bill by approximately  $250 bil- 
lion, or one-third. 
Even the administration, as part of the “September offensive” directed primar- 
ily at spending cuts, proposed $22 billion of what was for the first time euphe- 
mistically called “revenue enhancement.” But the primary problem developing 
during this period was the deepening recession. The “Rosy Scenario” of Febru- 
ary 1981 may or may not have been overly optimistic from the beginning, but 
now  the economic forecasts repeatedly had  to be revised downward. Ac- 
cording to David Stockman’s mea culpa (1987, 369), “The failed September 
Offensive had been aimed at reducing the 1984 deficit by $75 billion. Now the 
deficit estimate had increased by an order of magnitude-to  $150 billion. We 
were suddenly faced with the stark reality of what had been hidden from the 
beginning. Our sweeping fiscal plan had led straight into the jaws of  triple- 
digit deficits  .” 
Because the budget plan covered only the years through 1985, the apparent 
problem was still simply the size of the ERTA tax cut. Much discussion ensued 
about whether to delay the second year’s 10 percent rate cut or to abort the 
third year’s additional 10 percent cut. Policymakers still had not recognized 
the long-run implications of bracket indexing, scheduled to start after 1985. 
Without indexing, they could have avoided any legislation to raise taxes. By 
just waiting a bit longer, inflation would have raised taxes for them. The budget 
problem, although severe, would have been only temporary. 
Since supply-side theory recommended that marginal tax rates be reduced, 
21. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 passed by a vote of 238 to 195 in the House and 
89 to 11 in the Senate. 185  Tax Policy 
it might also be thought to recommend that rates stay reduced. Yet indexing 
was not put into the 1981 legislation  by any supply-sider such as Arthur Laffer, 
Jude Wanniski, Jack Kemp, or even Ronald Reagan. It was inserted late in the 
summer of  1981 by Republicans Bill Gradison in the House and Bill Arm- 
strong in the Senate. The administration did not even want indexing. As Con- 
gressman Gradison remembers it, the administration  tried to renege on a deal 
that indexing would be added to Conable-Hance, the administration’s bill in 
the House, if Armstrong managed to get it into the other version of the bill in 
the Senate.22 
Then, at the height of the bidding war, despite his administration’s earlier 
opposition, President Reagan used indexing to great advantage in selling his 
“bipartisan”  package (since Conable-Hance was named after members of both 
parties) over the “Ways and Means” (Democratic) plan. On 27 July, he went 
on national television with an oversize chart (reproduced here as figure 3.1) 
showing that, although the “Ways and Means” plan gave larger cuts initially, 
taxes would subsequently rise. With indexing, the “bipartisan” tax cut would 
remain a tax cut. 
This figure demonstrates vividly the single most unusual feature of the 1981 
legislation. Prior tax cuts were temporary. Not only was the 1981 tax cut the 
biggest in U.S. history; it was permanent.23  It was not the size of the deficit as 
much as this permanence that so greatly affected all subsequent tax policy- 
making. 
During the course of the next year, additional policymakers came to realize 
that revenue must be raised. Within the administration, some began seriously 
to discuss a $100 billion tax increase, and others began to resign.24  The form 
of  the tax increase, however, was still subject to debate. Democrats favored 
repeal of the third year’s rate cut; as Rostenkowski said, “I see it as repealing 
something that taxpayers have never enjoyed-as  opposed to taking money 
right out of their pockets with heavy consumer taxes” (Washington  Post,  10 
May  1982). The Republicans leaned toward excise taxes, user fees, greater 
enforcement, and  generally anything  that  appeared less  as  a  tax.  Asked 
whether the new tax bill represented a turnaround from the philosophy of last 
year’s supply-side tax cut, Senate Finance Chairman Bob Dole said, “We’re 
22. As Stockman tells it, “‘Armstrong doesn’t have the votes on the Senate floor,’ the Senate’s 
best vote-counter told Jim Baker. ‘We’ll bury indexing in an hour”’  (1987, 275). Then, after in- 
dexing was voted into the Senate bill by 57 to 40, “Conable insisted that tax indexing be incorpo- 
rated in Conable-Hance II. Both Don Regan and I fought that one, but Conable and his GOP 
colleagues persisted. We  solved the impasse by delaying the effective date of tax indexing until 
1985” (p. 281). While true supply-siders would favor both the rate cut and indexing, fiscal conser- 
vatives in the administration may have feared the sheer size of the rate cut and viewed bracket 
creep as a way to reduce it. The budget was defined as a three-year problem (1982-84),  however, 
so any cost after 1985 was irrelevant. 
23. Policymakers at the time used nominal terms to describe the 1981 act as the biggest tax cut 
in U.S. history and the 1982 act as the biggest tax increase in U.S. history. 
24. Paul Craig Roberts resigned as assistant secretary of  the Treasury in January 1982, and 
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not trying to make a U-turn; we’re just trying to avoid going over the cliff” 
(Washington  Post, 16 August 1982). 
One unusual feature of this bill is that, instead of beginning in the House of 
Representatives, as is required by the Constitution, it essentially began in the 
Senate Finance Committee. Chairman Dole circumvented the constitutional 
restriction by latching onto a minor tariff bill that had passed the House. His 
committee could then produce a virtually new bill and go straight to a confer- 
ence with House members to work out the “differences.” An immediate ques- 
tion is why Rostenkowski did not cry bloody murder at this constitutional out- 
rage. After all, one might think that the Democrats would want to help undo 
the Republican tax cut of  1981. The answer is that Rostenkowski was in on the 
plan. He wanted a bill in 1982, but many on his Ways and Means Committee 
did not. In many ways, the House was more supply-side oriented than the Sen- 
ate. Since its members faced election more often, the House was more suscep- 
tible to swings in the public mood such as the ongoing antitax revolt. Rosten- 
kowski could simply pick conferees that agreed with him, negotiate with the 
Senate, and avoid ever taking on his full committee (see also McLure 1990a). 
In its final form, the Tax  Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of  1982 
(TEFRA) raised $98.3 billion over three years. Given the flap over news ac- 
counts of major corporations that were paying no tax, it repealed the safe- 
harbor leasing provision of  the 1981 act. Mostly, it took little nicks at many 
features of  the law. It added to the individual alternative minimum tax (AMT), 
increased the floor for deductible medical expenses and casualty losses, taxed 
more of unemployment benefits, reduced deductions for some mineral compa- 
nies, required capitalization and amortization of construction period interest 
and property taxes, amended the completed contract method of accounting, 
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industrial development bonds, restricted allowable pension contributions and 
benefits, and amended provisions for foreign income, life insurance compa- 
nies, and unemployment taxes. It added excise taxes on airport use, communi- 
cation, and  cigarette^.^^ 
Its two largest provisions, however, were modifications to depreciation and 
compliance. Calculations such as those in table 3.4 above began to show that 
the combination of ACRS and ITC was considerably more generous than ex- 
pensing, especially since the rate of inflation had fallen. Inefficiencies and in- 
equities would result from high effective tax rates for some assets and negative 
effective tax rates for others. Thus began the development of the “level playing 
field.” In this case, tax increases had some political appeal by targeting those 
receiving extra benefits. Note that the calculations in table 3.4 reflect the fully 
phased-in version of the law, with double-declining-balance,  scheduled to be- 
gin after 1985. The 1982 act simply made permanent the 150 percent method 
that ERTA had specified for 1981-84.  It also decreased the basis for deprecia- 
tion deductions by half the investment tax credit. According to economists 
doing the calculations, these changes were designed to leave benefits approxi- 
mately on par with expensing. 
The compliance  provisions included various income reporting responsibilit- 
ies and increased penalties, but also the first withholding on interest and divi- 
dends, at a 10 percent rate. Wages and salaries had been subject to withholding 
for years, so it might be natural to think that interest and dividends could be 
subject to similar rules. Wages and salaries were no longer a major compliance 
problem, while interest and dividends were often not reported. Any significant 
administrative  problems had been considerably  reduced by the coming of com- 
puters to the banking and brokerage industries. But this provision raised a ter- 
rific outcry from banks and depositors, largely through Senator Bob Kasten’s 
write-in campaign. It was repealed the next year. 
Perhaps most striking about EFRA and other subsequent efforts to raise 
revenue is not the provisions that they included but one possibility that they 
excluded. They did not repeal bracket indexing. Another look back at table 3.3 
above reveals that, whereas the 1979 five-year projection showed a surplus as 
large as 2.4 percent of GNP, the 1982 projection showed a deficit as large as 
5.4 percent of  GNP. The result is that tax increase legislation took the hard 
road, with bills every year from 1982 to 1985. 
At the time of passage, the revenue effects of each bill were projected a few 
years ahead. More recently, however, the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) has estimated the past effects of each bill through 1990, relative to the 
law in effect before ERTA. These “static” estimates ignore possible behavioral 
responses. As shown in table 3.5, prior law would have increased revenues 
dramatically throughout the 1980s, but the 1981 bill reduced revenues by  at 
25. Commerce Clearing House (1981, 1982, and  1984) publications provide details and expla- 
nation of the three tax bills enacted in those years. Table 3.5  Changes in Budget Receipts, Fiscal Years 1982-90 
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Receipts under laws in effect 1/1/81  650.8  656.0  749.4  821.3  822.5  873.9  1,002.6  1,088.2  1,167.3 
Changes due to: 
ERTA (1981)  -35.6  -82.6  -136.8  -168.5  -170.3  -207.5  -264.4  -290.9  -322.8 
TEFRA (1982)  17.3  36.0  40.7  39.2  49.2  57.3  55.7  57.2 
Social Security (1983)  5.3  15.5  31.2  30.5  39.7  70.3  85.2  105.1 
DEFRA (1984)  .9  9.3  9.3  16.0  25.4  27.7  31.0 
TRA (1986)  -8.9  -24.4  -20.3 
Technical corrections (1987)  11.4  16.9  18.7 
Total receipts  617.8  597.5  666.4  736.8  734.0  776.4  908.7  975.8  1,057.6 
Note:  These figures are taken from selected rows of  table 3 in  Stewart (1991). Rows for administrative action and other small 
legislative changes are omitted here, but they are reflected in the last row for total receipts. 
Stewart’s explanation: “The first row of  figures is an estimate of the amount of  revenue that would have been generated in each 
fiscal year if no change to tax law had been made in the  1980s. Other rows gives estimates of the revenue gains or losses for that 
fiscal year attributable to the relevant change in tax law. For instance, if there had been no changes to federal tax law during the 
decade, then the federal government is estimated to have received $1167.3 billion in revenues during FY 1990. The net effect of the 
1981 ERTA is estimated to be a loss of  revenues during FY  1990 to the order of  $322.8 billion. The net effects of  changes to 
the 1981 ERTA itself are reflected in the estimates for the relevant subsequent tax laws; for example, the effects of rolling back the 
accelerated depreciation provisions of the ERTA that occurred in 1982 are reflected in figures for TEFRA.” 
Stewart’s source:  “Budget of  the United States, FY 1982-1990.  These are estimates provided in the annual budget documents, 
therefore they are subject to frequent revision. Therefore, these figures should be taken to represent ballpark figures, rather than 
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least $200 billion per year after 1987. Then the Tax Equity and Fiscal Respon- 
sibility Act of  1982 (TEFRA) raised revenue, by  $50 billion per year after 
1987. 
Later sections of this paper discuss how ambiguities in prospective revenue 
estimates cause problems for debate about proposed tax changes, but these 
ambiguities apply even to retrospective estimates for past tax changes. Since 
nobody really knows how the economy would have evolved under prior tax law, 
the OMB estimates in table 3.5 simply apply the old law to actual economic 
magnitudes to get prior law baseline revenues for comparison with actual reve- 
nues. In contrast, Lindsey provides one attempt to estimate how various eco- 
nomic magnitudes would have been different under prior law. Without some of 
the incentive-induced increases in the tax base, revenues under old law would 
not have been as high as in these OMB estimates. Thus, “ERTA cost less than 
one-third as much as implied by the naively calculated direct effect estimate” 
(Lindsey 1990,74). 
Meanwhile, demographic trends were playing havoc with the pay-as-you- 
go Social Security system. Payroll tax receipts would be sufficient to cover 
retirement benefit payouts while the baby-boom generation was still working 
but might not be sufficient after that population bulge was retired. In 1983, a 
‘‘bipartisan”  commission reached an agreement to restore the long-run health 
of the beleaguered system, through moderate increases in current payroll taxes 
and transfers from general revenue to build a temporary “surplus” in the trust 
fund. The effect starts small, as shown in table 3.5, but grows to $100 billion 
per year by  1990. 
The next large tax increase was the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA, 
to rhyme with TEFRA). It was raising only $25 billion per year by  1988, but 
it required many more pages than any of the previous bills. Just a list of the 
table of contents gives some idea of its breadth: tax changes affecting individu- 
als, tax provisions affecting business, foreign sales corporations and foreign 
tax provisions, private foundations and exempt organizations, leasing, retire- 
ment plans and other employee benefits, tax shelters and related transactions, 
straddles, life insurance provisions, estate and gift taxes, tax-exempt obliga- 
tions, administration and compliance, and excise taxes. Each of these chapters 
has twenty or thirty subheadings. 
Among other changes, DEFRA raised the depreciation lifetime for struc- 
tures from fifteen to eighteen years. Another bill the next year raised this life 
to nineteen years. 
Legislators during this period were forced by the deficit to raise taxes, and 
they were forced by  political realities to raise taxes on somebody who was 
“hiding” some special deal buried in the tax law. The general approach was 
to scour the tax code for provisions that were obscure rather than blatant. 
Policymakers could not increase rates or hit a popular personal deduction, but 
they could hit a “loose” provision that had been allowing some rich person to 
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in a fashion that is the exact opposite from the previous era. Up until  1981, 
Congress could return excess tax revenue, and undo the projected surplus, by 
granting new  special exemptions or deductions. After the rate cuts and in- 
dexing of ERTA, Congress needed to undo the projected deficit by  deleting 
such special provisions. Thus, deficit reduction also leveled the playing field. 
Tax reformers such as Stanley Surrey and Joe Pechman had for years decried 
the practice of opening new loopholes that erode the tax base and create unfair 
disparities in the taxation of otherwise similar individuals. The basic political 
and economic forces were not in their favor, however, until the 1981 bill pro- 
vided the logical extreme of such practices. It was the reductio ad absurdum 
of opening loopholes. But the sleeper was the indexing provision, as it would 
force policymakers thereafter to close loopholes instead. 
This deficit-driven policy-making has advantages and disadvantages. Many 
of those interviewed think that it puts far too much emphasis on revenue con- 
siderations rather than other policy considerations. Some “good” tax policy 
changes might actually lose revenue. If so, they can’t get enacted. On the other 
hand, given all the “good policy” reasons of Surrey and Pechman for closing 
various loopholes, deficit-driven  policy-making  might well create better policy. 
Indeed, the whole point of  the indexing provision was to put fiscal discipline 
into the tax policy-making process. Congress should be run like a corporation 
for which raising funds must be recognized as costly and spending funds must 
be demonstrated as worthwhile. 
At least two books and many articles have been written in attempts to ex- 
plain how the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was able to reverse previous practice, 
take on the special interests, close loopholes, and provide true reform (see, 
e.g., Birnbaum and Murray 1987; and Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam 1990). It 
was indeed important legislation. But the direction of  tax policy-making had 
really changed by  1981. As we shall see in the next section, the many diverse 
and arcane base-broadening provisions of the 1986 act were very similar in 
nature to the earlier revenue-raising provisions of 1982-85. 
3.4  The Level Playing Field 
Various political and economic forces were still coming at the tax code from 
different directions, to be sure, but they were beginning to push it together 
instead of pulling it apart. Perhaps four developments were most important. 
First, supply-side theory continued to affect tax policy. Calls were heard for a 
“flat tax” that would put all taxpayers together in the same low tax bracket with 
absolutely no deductions other than those needed to define income. Since total 
federal individual tax revenues were about 11 percent of personal income, one 
naive approach would simply define a broad tax base equal to personal income, 
tax it at 11 percent, and get at least the same revenue. The low rate would be a 
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that some components of personal income would be difficult to tax. Also, this 
extreme version of a flat tax would greatly increase the burden on poor and 
low-income taxpayers while greatly reducing that on high-income taxpayers. 
A “modified flat tax” (on consumed income) with a large personal exemption 
and a single tax bracket of  19 percent is fully described in Hall and Rabushka 
(1983). 
Second, the tax system had become inordinately complex. In addition to 
complaints from taxpayers in all kinds of situations, there were estimates from 
economists that 
the average compliance time comes to 2 1.7 hours, valued at $23  1, and $44 
in additional expenses, for a total of $275 per household. Applying the re- 
weighted averages to an estimated 97 million taxpaying units in 1982 yields 
aggregate estimates of 2.13 billion hours and a total resource cost of $26.7 
billion. This cost is approximately 1.4 percent of aggregate adjusted gross 
income, and more than seven percent of total federal and state income tax 
revenue. (Slemrod and Sorum 1984,465) 
This is only an average. Since most taxpayers took less than twenty-one hours 
to fill out the short form for a return with the standard deduction, other tax- 
payers must have had to take much more than twenty-one hours. Many had to 
fill out ten or twenty forms just for one return. In contrast, a modified flat tax 
such as that in Hall and Rabushka could be filed once a year on a postcard. 
Third, public confidence in the tax system was further undermined by re- 
ports about corporations and high-income individuals paying no tax. In Octo- 
ber 1984, Robert McIntyre and his Citizens for Tax Justice calculated the aver- 
age effective tax rate for 250 large profitable corporations in years 1981-83. 
He found that 128 paid no federal income taxes in at least one of these three 
years and that seventeen paid no taxes in all three years. For example, “The 
single biggest gainer from the 1981 legislation was Ronald Reagan’s former 
employer, General Electric. GE earned $6.5 billion in pre-tax domestic profits 
over the three years, paid not one cent in federal income taxes, and claimed tax 
refunds of $283 million in taxes paid before Reagan took office” (McIntyre 
1984, 2). Many of these companies used safe-harbor leasing to avoid paying 
tax, but the repeal of safe-harbor leasing in 1982 did not come fast enough to 
avoid the attention to other problems with the corporate tax brought by  the 
intense media coverage of this report. 
For individuals, the U.S.  Department of the Treasury (1985) examined the 
1983 returns of taxpayers with “total positive income” over $250,000 per year 
and found that 64 percent reported “losses” from partnerships, subchapter S 
corporations, rental and royalty activities, farms, and businesses. Of this entire 
high-income group, 11.4 percent had tax liability that was less than 5 percent 
of income. Another 9.8 percent had effective tax rates between 5 and 10 per- 
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decided, correctly, that such a system was just not fair. Thus, the “horizontal 
equity” version of the level playing field meant that taxpayers in the same eco- 
nomic circumstances ought to have to pay the same tax. 
Fourth, economists both in and out of  academe were calculating marginal 
effective tax rates of the sort shown above in table 3.4, with huge disparities 
between different types of assets or financing. Perhaps the major source of 
these differences was the investment tax credit (ITC) that was available for 
equipment but not for other investments of the firm. To economists, these dis- 
parities did not present a problem of equity, for no one ought to be concerned 
with the “fair” treatment of a machine relative to a building. Eiquity is an issue 
only among individuals. In equilibrium, individuals must be earning the same 
net-of-tax rate of return on a machine as on a building because otherwise they 
would invest more in the favorable asset until net returns were equalized. In- 
stead, the problem was one of economic efficiency. If net returns were equal 
and effective tax rates were not, then the differences must show up in gross 
rates of return on these assets. Thus, some assets must be more productive, to 
cover a high effective tax rate, while other assets could be less productive and 
still yield the same net rate of return to the investor. The tax system was “dis- 
torting” the allocation of resources, as it encouraged more investment in the 
asset that was less productive. 
Even with a fixed total stock of  capital, according to this argument, total 
output would increase by taking investment away from the asset with the low 
gross rate of return and putting it into the asset with the high gross rate of 
return. Moreover, just such a reallocation would be induced by leveling the 
relative tax treatment of different assets. It was sometimes difficult for econo- 
mists to explain this efficiency version of the level playing field, however, so 
they did not always object to the perception of inequity created by disparate 
treatments of different assets or firms.26 
This efficiency argument rejects implicit industrial policy, the notion that 
government knows better than private firms what assets are the most produc- 
tive. But the investment tax credit was not always conceived as industrial pol- 
icy. In 1964, it was primarily a temporary macroeconomic tool used to stimu- 
late aggregate demand. The ITC was repealed in  1969 and reintroduced in 
1971. Perhaps it made sense to limit a temporary ITC to equipment, where 
stimulus could have immediate effect, and to exclude buildings, where lags 
might delay the effect of the stimulus until after the need was long gone. This 
logic was  lost, however, when the ITC became permanent in  1975. It then 
26. The confusion of these two concepts is interesting in itself. I would have expected econo- 
mists to  emphasize efficiency arguments for a level playing field and others to  voice the equity 
arguments. Certainly members of Congress were heard discussing the equitable treatment of dif- 
ferent assets or firms. But these comments may have been directed at the lay public. In the inter- 
views for this paper, a surprising number of noneconomist policy-makers described very  accu- 
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became a microeconomic tool that influenced not just the amount but also the 
type of investment. 
This free-market approach of economists should not be oversold as a driving 
force for tax reform. At best, the gains in economic efficiency would be small 
for all taxpayers. More certainly, the cost of  lost credits would be large for 
particular taxpayers. Also, the playing field could never be completely level 
as long as owner-occupied housing retained its untaxed treatment. Besides, 
Congress was not about to reject the government’s influence over the allocation 
of  resources. Provisions of the tax code were intended to influence home- 
ownership,  charitable contributions,  retirement savings, corporate research and 
development, pollution control, and other worthy causes. Instead, the point 
is simply that such provisions had been overextended through the years. Shel- 
ter organizers were able to attract investors to projects that had little or no 
economic return, only tax advantages. It was merely a happy coincidence for 
economists that their view  about the inefficiency of  disparate effective tax 
rates seemed to mesh with the more populist view about the inequity of dis- 
parate effective tax rates. It was clear that investments were misallocated, sim- 
ply because so many high-income individuals and corporations were paying 
no tax. 
Several issues of  perennial interest to tax reformers are distinctly absent 
from the list given above of developments affecting this new climate for tax 
reform. In particular, this list excludes the classic argument that loopholes for 
the rich should be closed in order to restore the “intended” degree of progressi- 
vity given by the graduated marginal rate structure (see Musgrave 1987; and 
Pechman 1990). The list excludes consideration of revenue. It excludes peren- 
nial (and therefore “traditional”) arguments about the remaining effects of in- 
flation on the measurement of  taxable income and the double taxation of 
corporate-source income. Senator Bill Bradley was probably the first member 
of Congress to grasp the new climate for tax reform. In his first term as senator, 
he devoted considerable energies to fashioning a comprehensive tax reform 
plan, cosponsored with Representative Dick Gephardt and introduced as the 
Fair Tax Act of 1982. He considered the classic arguments for tax reform and 
rejected them. He did not propose further indexation for inflation or integration 
of corporate and personal taxes. He decided not to try to close loopholes in a 
way that would raise the aggregate burden of high-income taxpayers. Indeed, 
he decided not to raise revenues at all or even to change the distribution of tax 
burdens. The reasons for such a strategy may seem obvious now, namely, lower 
marginal rates, less complexity, more similar tax burdens for those in the same 
income group, and a more efficient allocation of resources. But consider how 
his colleagues must have wondered at the time. If this proposal does not change 
the amount of tax paid in total or by  any particular income group, then why 
bother? Put bluntly, “Simplification for the sake of  simplification is to beat 
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dime’s dent in the deficit” (Senator Packwood, quoted in the Washington  Post, 
30 November 1984). 
The Bradley-Gephardt proposal was a modified flat tax in the sense that it 
would eliminate a long list of ‘‘loopholes,”  broaden the base, and reduce mar- 
ginal tax rates to only three tax brackets of  14, 26, and 30 percent. Major 
personal deductions were retained, such as home mortgage interest, charitable 
contributions, and state and local income and property taxes, but they applied 
only against the 14 percent rate. The return would not fit on a postcard, but 
filing would be simpler because many taxpayers would use the enlarged stan- 
dard deduction. Other forms were eliminated altogether. Taxes would rise for 
shelter abusers and fall for others. The plan would repeal the ITC and reduce 
the corporate rate to 30 percent but leave corporate taxes unchanged. 
There seemed to be much discussion of  modified flat rate proposals, but 
nobody seemed to know quite how to forge the right coalition. The Bradley- 
Gephardt plan was not taken too seriously. Yet the Reagan reelection campaign 
was apparently afraid that Walter Mondale would endorse Bradley-Gephardt 
and steal the issue for the Democrats. Given the president’s long-standing 
desire to reduce marginal tax rates, they  decided to preempt the Democrats 
in the February  1984 State of  the Union address by having him order the 
Treasury Department to conduct a “study” that would not be due until after the 
election. Then, as it turns out, Mondale never got close to endorsing Bradley- 
Gephardt. 
The ensuing debate involved several years, many interesting personalities, 
and umpteen versions of tax reform. Besides Bradley-Gephardt and the Repub- 
lican plan called Kemp-Kasten, the public had opportunities to examine the 
Treasury proposal, the President’s proposal, Rostenkowski’s “staff option,” the 
House bill, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Bob Packwood’s staff option, 
and the Senate bill as well as the final conference agreement signed as the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986. The political interactions of these policymakers and their 
various proposals have been fully described elsewhere (see Birnbaum and 
Murray 1987; and Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam 1990), so I will try to touch 
on a few issues of particular interest. 
Because of the political ploy of ordering a “study” to be completed after the 
election, tax experts at the Treasury Department were given a rare opportunity 
to craft a very apolitical document. White House officials did not even want to 
know what was in it. Within this ivory tower environment, economists had an 
unusual say in the formulation of the plan. For this reason, many other econo- 
mists were surprised that Treasury economists did not propose a consumed- 
income tax that would allow a deduction for all savings and expensing of all 
investment. It would reduce the cost of capital, set all marginal effective tax 
rates to  zero, and remove  problems measuring real income. McLure and 
Zodrow (1987, 40-41)  list several reasons for rejecting a consumed-income 
tax, but the most compelling is that it would have to include all borrowing in 195  Tax Policy 
the tax base.27  The public was simply not ready to accept the idea of paying a 
tax on borrowed funds that did not even represent income to the taxpayer (see 
Regan  1988,  206). Instead  of  including all borrowed funds, a  consumed- 
income tax could disallow all interest deductions, but public acceptance  of this 
idea was no easier. 
Even within an income tax, some economists in  the Treasury wanted to 
allow expensing for investment. Without including borrowing in the tax base 
or disallowing interest deductions, however, expensing would make marginal 
effective tax rates negative: for a debt-financed investment, the firm would get 
to deduct both the value of the asset and the normal return on it. Expensing by 
itself would cost considerable revenue and not fix problems with shelters. 
Thus, the decision was made to design a more comprehensive income tax 
base. The Treasury followed the new logic of tax reform insofar as it wanted a 
plan that was revenue neutral, distributionally neutral, and simpler, one that 
would equalize the tax treatment of individuals in the same income group (the 
equity version of the level playing field) and equalize the tax treatment of dif- 
ferent types of investment (the efficiency version of  the level playing field). 
Among other provisions, the Treasury proposal would have eliminated percent- 
age depletion, expensing of intangible drilling costs for oil and gas, expensing 
of  many expenditures in multiyear production, the exclusion for most em- 
ployee fringe benefits, the deduction for state and local taxes, and the entire 
minimum tax. It would have substantially increased the personal exemption. 
As in Bradley-Gephardt, the original idea was to be revenue neutral for indi- 
viduals and for corporations considered separately. When all the tough choices 
were made about which credits and deductions to eliminate, these constraints 
initially led to three personal rate brackets of  16, 28, and 37 percent. This 
result was a bit of  a disappointment since lower rates had been hoped for. 
When the same process of base broadening was conducted on the corporate 
side, enough new revenue was generated to reduce the corporate rate all the 
way to 28 percent. This base broadening included the repeal of the investment 
tax credit and a depreciation scheme that was based on economists’ estimates 
of real economic depreciation (Hulten and Wykoff 198 1). 
Officials in the Treasury had two major problems with this outcome. First, 
Secretary Don Regan had an aesthetic problem. He thought that the personal 
rates of 16,28, and 37 percent were cumbersome. He wanted something simple 
and catchy like the earlier Kemp-Roth 10-10-10  or the Conable-Jones 10-5- 
3. “Give me 15-25-35,”  he ordered. Second, attorneys in  the Treasury had 
a legal problem. With a rate as low as 28  percent, the corporate tax might 
become a shelter that allowed high-income individuals to incorporate them- 
27. See n. 19 above. The taxpayer must be consuming all income and all borrowed funds, minus 
any  monies put into various  forms of savings and investment. Thus, the inclusion of borrowed 
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selves, pay  the 28 percent rate, and avoid  the higher 37 percent personal 
rate. The corporate rate and the top personal rate needed to be closer together. 
The obvious solution to both problems was to lower the personal rates to 
15-25-35  and make up the revenue by raising the corporate rate to 33 per- 
cent.28 
Thus was born the proposal to shift $150 billion of burden over five years 
from individuals to corporations. The Treasury had an aesthetic problem and a 
legal problem, operating in a relatively apolitical environment. The solution 
was a political master stroke. All subsequent versions of tax reform retained a 
similar shift of at least $100 billion over five years, for good political reasons. 
It allowed tables of estimated distributional effects to show a tax cut for every 
personal income group, even in the revenue-neutral bill. Otherwise, the table 
would have to show some tax increases to offset any group that received even 
a small net tax cut. Everybody knew that individuals somewhere bear the ulti- 
mate burden of corporate income taxes, but most simply ignored it.29  Besides, 
as pointed out earlier, the corporate tax had fallen from 30 percent of federal 
revenue in 1954 to 6 percent of federal revenue in 1983. Perhaps this trend had 
gone too far. 
Would President Reagan recommend a corporate tax increase of this magni- 
tude, after just pushing the largest corporate tax decrease in history? For the 
success of tax reform, the device was brilliant, like Nixon going to China. On 
the other hand, it is not clear whether Reagan confused the cut in the corporate 
rate with the increase in the corporate burden. The day after praising the Trea- 
sury plan in his 1985 State of the Union address, Reagan was interviewed by 
the Wall Street Journal (8 February 1985): “The president said he hadn’t stud- 
ied the plan in sufficient detail to realize that it sought an increase in the rela- 
tive tax burden on business. Moreover, he suggested that taxes on corporations 
are merely passed on to individuals anyway. ‘Someday,’ he said, ‘I would hope 
that we could arrive at a tax structure that would recognize that you can’t tax 
things, you only tax people.’ ” 
Following Bradley-Gephardt, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (1984) 
proposal adopted the new logic of tax reform. It was revenue neutral, distribu- 
tionally neutral, and leveled the playing field. Unlike Bradley-Gephardt,  how- 
ever, it did not eschew traditional tax reform issues. It addressed the integration 
of  corporate and personal taxes by  providing firms with a deduction for 50 
percent of dividends paid. It addressed the problem of inflation in measuring 
real income by providing indexation of interest, depreciation,  and capital gains. 
28. Note that the corporate rate could have been raised without affecting the overall corporate 
burden, e.g., by  allowing more accelerated depreciation. By this time, the Treasury experts were 
wedded to the idea of a tax on comprehensive economic income, however. Given the “ideal” tax 
base, a higher rate necessarily meant a higher burden. For more discussion of the reasons for this 
shift, see McLure (1986, 1643). 
29. The  distributional burdens of corporate tax changes are estimated by Feldstein (1988). 197  Tax Policy 
Some of these provisions made the proposed law more complex rather than 
simpler. 
Moreover, these problems with inflation simply do not have the same kind 
of effect as bracket creep. With fixed nominal tax brackets, any rate of inflation 
would keep raising taxes as a percentage of income by continuously pushing 
individuals into ever higher brackets. Thus, the indexing of brackets in the 
of 
deficits. These other problems are different. Inflation does reduce the rea  value 
of  depreciation deductions, and it thus takes the effective tax rate to a new 
higher level. However, a constant rate of inflation does not keep raising the 
effective tax rate beyond that level. Similarly, the taxation of purely nominal 
capital gains and nominal interest raises real taxes to a higher level. In these 
cases, an increase in the rate of inflation will increase the tax, but a decrease 
in the rate of inflation will decrease the tax. Any given level of inflation could 
be offset by ad hoc adjustments such as accelerated depreciation or an exclu- 
sion for part of capital gains. 
Thus, the point of these additional forms of indexing in the Treasury pro- 
posal was to account automatically for variations in the rate of inflation. The 
effective tax rate would be invariant to the rate of inflation, only with indexing 
for depreciation, interest, and capital gains. It was a traditional economist’s 
type of reform, of no interest to Congress or constituents. 
In fact, economists have long wondered why businesses do not show more 
interest in these forms of indexation. After all, the increase in later years’ de- 
preciation deductions to account for inflation would raise the present value of 
allowances and thus reduce the cost of capital. While businesses would rather 
have indexation than nothing, the relevant choice is usually between indexation 
and acceleration. For a given revenue cost, acceleration provides deductions 
that are earlier and more certain. Businesses see indexation as a provision that 
could subsequently be repealed by  Congress, thus providing lower benefits 
than were expected at the time of investment. Moreover, traditional accounting 
practices are dominated by nominal magnitudes. Accountants are uncomfort- 
able with deductions that are uncertain in nominal terms, even if they are more 
certain in real terms. Similarly, businesses showed little interest in the deduc- 
tion for dividends paid. 
For better or worse, these traditional reform provisions for indexing and 
integration  did not survive the new climate for reform. The 50 percent dividend 
deduction was cut to 10 percent by  the president’s proposal, delayed by  the 
House bill, and dropped by the Senate bill. Interest indexing was deemed un- 
workable and did not appear in any version beyond the Treasury plan. Capital 
gains indexing was modified by the president’s proposal and dropped thereaf- 
ter. Finally, depreciation indexing was retained by the president’s proposal, cut 
by the House, and dropped by the Senate (see the details given in exhibit 3.1). 
The Treasury proposal was also criticized for raising the cost of  capital. 
Even though the corporate rate was reduced from 46 to 33 percent and allow- 
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Exhibit 3.1 
Depreciation indexing, a case study in policy-making 
The basic economic argument for depreciation indexing is that policy  should 
decide the level of  tax revenue and investment incentives, without interference 
from changes in the rate of  inflation. The Accelerated Cost Recovery System 
enacted in  1981 was intended, in part, to offset the extraordinarily high rates of 
inflation at the time. But, when inflation fell dramatically, accelerated allowances 
were more generous than required to offset inflation. Indexing would maintain 
the real value of deductions whatever the rate of inflation. 
At the Treasury in 1985, I might have expected noneconomist policymakers 
to reject these arguments, but I did not expect trouble from economists as well. 
Once interest indexing was rejected as unworkable, economists at the Joint Tax 
Committee argued that the system would be unbalanced with one and not the 
other. The advantage of  deducting inflation-bloated interest payments was ap- 
proximately offset by the disadvantage of  deducting inflation-eroded deprecia- 
tion allowances.  The Treasury  countered that, if  they  were in  the same tax 
bracket, the lender’s extra tax would exactly offset the borrower’s benefit, so de- 
preciation should be considered separately. The economists responded that lend- 
ers were generally in lower tax brackets than borrowers. 
Rostenkowski’s staff option ignored depreciation indexing, but the Treasury 
came up with a partial plan that indexed allowances for 80 percent of the extent 
to which the rate of inflation exceeded 5 percent. It had no estimated revenue 
implications since projected inflation was less than 5 percent, but Congress was 
still uninterested. We prepared all the economic arguments for indexing, with all 
the charts and graphs, and drove to Capitol Hill to meet with the Ways and Means 
task force on depreciation headed by Richard Gephardt. We never got to discuss 
it. When the issue arose, Gephardt simply said that Rostenkowski had talked on 
the phone with James Baker while we were driving over. Baker had made a plea 
for this partial indexing plan, and Rostenkowski had agreed to 50 percent of 
inflation over 5 percent. It was a done deal. 
The Treasury Department worked more closely, in some ways, with the Re- 
publican Senate and managed to get depreciation indexing into Packwood’s staff 
options. Senator Danforth, a Republican on the Finance Committee, got it taken 
out altogether. Even later, the issue had some appeal to Deputy Treasury Secre- 
tary Richard Darman, but not for economic reasons. He simply saw it as a way 
to reduce the cost of capital with most of  the revenue cost outside the five-year 
budget window. Darman had become known for a certain sleight of  hand, so I 
even tried suggesting to him that we support the right policy for the wrong rea- 
son: by slowing down allowances but indexing at the same time, we could reduce 
the cost of  capital and raise revenue  in  the five-year budget  period. Still it 
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ances were indexed, the ITC was repealed and asset lives lengthened.30  Typical 
were the comments of the Chamber of Commerce (1984, 1): “This increased 
tax wedge on capital income would reduce capital investment and, conse- 
quently, harm economic growth rates, reduce US.  international competitive- 
ness and exacerbate the federal deficit. .  .  .  [It] constitutes a reversal of the pro- 
growth policies inaugurated in 1981.” 
Finally, all these “modified flat tax” proposals could be criticized for offer- 
ing false rate reduction. Consider, for example, a world where all compensa- 
tion is always paid 80 percent as wages and 20 percent as fringe benefits and 
where wages are subject to a tax rate of 50 percent. A revenue neutral reform 
could then broaden the tax base to include all fringes and reduce the tax rate 
to 40 percent. Yet it would have absolutely no effect. If the ratio of fringes to 
wages is fixed, as assumed, then 40 percent of  compensation is paid in tax 
before the reform as well as after. The rate reduction is more effective if fringes 
are fixed as work effort responds. The overall effect depends on the flexibility 
of all tax advantages such as fringe benefits, interest deductions, and charit- 
able contributions. 
Thus, the release of the Treasury proposal in November 1984 was accompa- 
nied by acclaim from many economists and traditional reform advocates, alarm 
from businesses and capital formation advocates, and yawns from the general 
public. Senator Bob Packwood, the chairman of the Finance Committee, said, 
“I sort of  like the tax code the way  it is” (Washington  Post, 30  November 
1984).  Secretary Regan quickly noted that his proposal “was written on a word 
processor. It can be changed” (Washington  Post,  8 December 1984). 
The next most crucial step in the progress toward tax reform was the January 
1985  job switch by Donald Regan and James Baker. It put an advocate of tax 
reform next to the ear of the president and a savvy politician in charge of the 
main tax reform effort. The president did not really need to be convinced, 
however, as he was always in favor of lower tax rates. With some misgivings, 
the administration decided to make tax reform the primary domestic policy 
initiative of Reagan’s second term. So the new Treasury secretary Baker and 
Deputy Secretary Richard Darman set about trying to make the proposal more 
acceptable. Besides reducing the traditional reform provisions for indexing and 
integration, they provided better investment incentives through acceleration of 
depreciation allowances. They restored tax breaks for oil and gas, fringes, and 
some other popular benefits. In order to keep the personal rates at 15-25-35, 
30. The marginal effective tax rate in the corporate sector was 29 percent under 1985 law and 
would rise to 43 percent under the Treasury proposal, as estimated by Fullerton (1987). Consider- 
ing components separately, the 29 percent rate would rise to 41 percent with just interest indexing, 
would rise to 40 percent with just repeal of the ITC, would fall less than  1 percent with just the 
full taxation of real  capital  gains, would fall to  28 percent with just the  deduction for half of 
dividends, and would fall to 27 percent with just the personal rate cuts. It  would rise to 30 percent 
with just the corporate rate cut because the reduced tax on equity is more than offset  by the reduced 
advantage of nominal interest deductions. Under the  same assumptions, this effective tax rate is 
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they recouped some revenue through a tough additional minimum tax. Then a 
last-minute computer snag left the new proposal still significantly short of rev- 
enue. Thus was born the “windfall recapture tax” proposal to raise $56 billion 
over the five-year budget period. The logic was that firms had already made 
investments to earn income that they had expected would be taxed at the 46 
percent rate, so the reduction to a 33 percent rate provided an unexpected 
windfall that could be recaptured. On the release of the president’s proposal in 
May  1985, this provision caused the biggest stir. It was viewed as a retroactive 
tax and therefore unfair. 
When I was asked to speak to various groups about the tax reform process, 
I used to bring with me a balloon that I would underinflate to fit in the palm of 
my hand. “The revenue needed for neutrality with current law is like the air in 
this balloon,” I would say, “and each of the other demands on the tax system is 
a constraint, like pressing on one part of the balloon.” When I pressed one part 
of the balloon, I got a bulge sticking out somewhere else. The pressure to 
reduce rates to 15-25-35  created in the Treasury proposal a bulge in the form 
of “economic” depreciation allowances that were viewed as inadequate to pro- 
vide basic incentives for capital formation and competitiveness. The pressure 
to accelerate those allowances in the president’s proposal just pushed the bulge 
somewhere else, primarily in the form of the windfall recapture tax. 
Dan Rostenkowski, chairman of the House Ways  and Means Committee, 
accepted the president’s challenge to push tax reform. Actually, he thought that 
it was based on solid Democratic principles of fairness: it would take the poor 
off the tax roles, remove shelters for the rich, and raise corporate taxes. Demo- 
crats could hardly reject such suggestions. Then, in the committee markup 
during the fall of 1985, Rostenkowski was under considerable pressure to re- 
store several tax breaks, primarily  state and local tax  deductions. He also 
dropped the recapture tax. The result was a major bulge in personal tax rates, 
with the top bracket reduced only to a 38 percent rate. The House bill also did 
not provide the full $2,000 exemption that was viewed as important to take 
those below the poverty line off the tax roles. Finally, it shifted $140 billion 
over five years from individual to corporate taxes. 
House Republicans objected, md they managed to stop the entire bill on a 
procedural rule. The primary domestic policy initiative of the president’s sec- 
ond term was killed by  lawmakers in his own party. It was resurrected only 
when President Reagan traveled to Capitol Hill. He encouraged Republicans 
to keep tax reform alive and vote for this bill by promising to veto it if adequate 
changes were not made in the Senate. H.R. 3838 limped through on a voice 
vote in December. 
Robert Packwood, Republican chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, 
had no real interest in taking up tax reform at all. Quotes given above indicate 
that he liked the existing tax code, saw no point in simplification for its own 
sake, and had greater concern about the deficit. However, he could not let the 
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made up yet another set of staff options for the Finance Committee delibera- 
tions. In order to suppress the personal rate bulge and the corporate tax bulge, 
Packwood’s staff options suggested disallowing deductions for business pay- 
ments of excise taxes. But the air of the balloon was simply pushed out into a 
new bulge. This veiled increase in excise taxes was preferred to the increase 
in corporate taxes by  some lawmakers, but it violated accepted practices of 
measuring net income by the difference between gross income and legitimate 
business expenses such as excise taxes paid. It did not survive the markup. 
Moreover, senators on the committee were quick to restore many tax breaks 
that they themselves had devised in past years, from municipal bonds to natural 
resources. The coup de griice was an accelerated depreciation scheme for “pro- 
ductivity property” that allowed lawmakers to pick and choose which assets in 
which industries were to be deemed “productive” enough to warrant special 
treatment. The revenue cost was not as big a problem as the symbol: this con- 
cept flew  in the face of  the entire spirit of  tax reform that would level the 
playing field and leave profit-maximizing firms with the task of deciding which 
were the best investments. It was business as usual, a depreciation scheme 
written by Charls Walker and Ernest Christian, the same corporate lobbyists 
who had devised the earlier ACRS in 1981 and even ADR in 1971. 
With a revenue hemorrhage on his hands, Chairman Packwood decided to 
stop the markup. On Friday, 18 April, Packwood had his famous two-pitcher 
lunch with Chief of Staff Bill Diefenderfer at the Irish Times. They discussed 
the impending death of tax reform, a possible minimalist strategy of closing a 
few loopholes to get some rate reduction, and an alternative, more dramatic 
strategy. What would really make tax reform attractive, they reasoned, would 
be very low rates. If the top rate were only 25 percent, for example, then maybe 
taxpayers would not mind losing a few deductions. What would it take to get 
rates that low? Joint Tax Committee Chief of Staff David Brockway was asked 
to devise a new plan altogether. He returned with no state and local tax deduc- 
tion, no mortgage interest deduction, and no charitable contribution deduction 
but a top rate of 25 percent. 
This plan became the starting point for a “core” group of  seven senators 
who showed some interest. They “spent” a point or two of  rate reduction to 
add back most of  those key, popular personal deductions. Since the low top 
rate created a huge tax cut for high-income brackets, and since the bill was 
intended to be  approximately distributionally neutral, they  accepted other 
changes that would raise the tax on high-income individuals such as the full 
taxation  of  nominal  capital gains  and  the  disallowance of  some “passive 
losses.” These hits were not easy to take, but finally the balloon was starting to 
assume a round shape. 
The Finance Committee ended up with a 27 percent rate, an income range 
over which the benefits of exemptions and the lower 15  percent rate bracket 
were phased out by a 5 percent surcharge, and a unanimous 20 to 0 vote for 
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required enough revenue-losing modifications to require a top rate of 28 per- 
cent. With the 5 percent surcharge over the phase-out range, the maximum 
marginal rate was actually 33 percent. The president signed the bill on 22 Oc- 
tober 1986. 
3.5  Some Final Remarks 
The Tax Reform Act of  1986 was a very intricately constructed package of 
provisions, each of which depended on the others. The original “supply-side” 
idea of greater incentives gave the motivation for lower rates, but the era of 
“deficits” implied that these rate reductions must be paid by base broadening 
and a “level playing field.” 
Plenty of  criticisms were leveled at the legislation, but mostly they were 
attempts to take some of the interwoven provisions without others. “We like 
the lower corporate rate, but we don’t like the slower allowances.” As this over- 
simplified example makes clear, you can’t have one without the other. In partic- 
ular, many complaints were heard about the full taxation of nominal capital 
gains. Certainly, there are good reasons for a capital gains exclusion or at least 
for indexing in order to tax only the real capital gain. But this imperfect provi- 
sion was a necessary price of the package since it was the only way to keep the 
percentage tax cut in the top income group down  to one digit. Even then, lower- 
income groups received smaller cuts. Similarly, neither the minimum tax nor 
the passive loss rule would be needed in a perfect system,  but they were needed 
to achieve this reform. They raised revenue from existing shelters of  high- 
income taxpayers, and they help prevent new shelters, as discussed below. 
Others point to the anomaly that the marginal tax rate increases from 15 
percent, to 28 percent, to 33 percent, but then falls back to 28 percent for the 
highest-income taxpayers. It does not seem fair to tax the richest at a lower 
rate than those less rich. However, while the marginal tax rate is important for 
the incentive to earn one more dollar, it has little to do with equity. Fairness is 
best measured by taxes paid as a fraction of income, the average tax  rate. Since 
the first block of income is untaxed, someone in the 15 percent marginal rate 
bracket has a tax that is less than 15 percent of total income, and someone in 
the next 28 percent bracket has a tax that is less than 28 percent of total income. 
The stated purpose of the 5 percent surcharge in the penultimate income group 
is to “phase out” the benefits of the untaxed block of income and the 15 percent 
rate block of income, bringing the total tax up to 28 percent of total income. 
As soon as the average tax rate hits 28 percent, the 5 percent surcharge ends, 
and the taxpayer is back down to a 28 percent marginal rate. In other words, 
the average tax rate is always less than 28 percent until reaching the highest 
income level, where every dollar is taxed at 28 percent.31 
3  1. This provision is similar to the maximum effective rate limitation of  1944-63,  which capped 
the average tax rate below the 90+ percent top marginal tax rate (see table 3.1 above). 203  Tax Policy 
Still, why try to claim that the top rate is 28 percent instead of admitting the 
33 percent rate and just extending it out to all taxpayers above a certain income 
level? In the first place, senators did not grant that the top rate was really 33 
percent. Yes or no, they would ask, is it possible for anyone’s tax to exceed 28 
percent of their taxable income? No. In the second place, when senators were 
trading off key deductions against each percentage point of tax rate, as it in- 
creased from 26 to 27 and then to 28 percent, they were told that a 1 percent 
increase in the top bracket would raise about $30 billion over five years. In 
contrast, extending an official 33 percent rate bracket to those few taxpayers 
above the phase-out range would raise only about $25 billion over five years. 
It made no sense to these senators to enact a 5 percentage point increase in the 
top rate to raise $25 billion when a 1 point increase in the top rate would raise 
$30 billion.32 
Another question is whether Congress went too far in attacking shelters, the 
“whipping boy” of tax reform. First, rate cuts would make shelters less attrac- 
tive simply by reducing the tax saving from sheltering a dollar at the margin. 
Second, longer lives for both equipment and structures would chip away at the 
basic building blocks of which shelters are constructed. Third, the capital gains 
rate hike would make the conversion of ordinary income into capital gains 
income irrelevant. Fourth, at-risk rules were tightened. Fifth, the passive loss 
rule was designed specifically with shelters in mind. Finally, the tough new 
alternative minimum tax would keep any taxpayer from overusing what was 
left of any tax shelter arrangement. Was this overkill? In combination, these 
features are guaranteed to stop pure shelter  arrangement^.^^ And, once a shelter 
is stopped, each additional hit is no longer relevant. The passive loss rule may 
be important in preventing pure shelter arrangements, but it acquires little 
long-run revenue because virtually nobody goes so far as to pay it. 
Although more taxpayers were induced to use the standard deduction instead 
of itemizing, these antishelter and other provisions helped keep the final bill 
far from a “simplification.” But that goal was a bit of  a red hemng anyway. 
(For an opposing view, see McLure [1990a]). Uninformed taxpayers thought 
that simplification meant having two rate brackets instead of eleven, although 
calculating taxable income is a much tougher  job than using taxable income in 
the rate tables to figure the tax. Also, the media used “simplification” to sum- 
marize other aspects of tax reform.34  Simplification was primarily important 
to the extent that the average taxpayer thought that high-income individuals 
32. Current estimates of the U.S.  Congressional Budget Office (1990) suggest that a 1 percent- 
age point increase in the 28 percent rate would raise $50 billion over five years while the extension 
of the 33 percent rate would raise $40  billion over five years. 
33. McLure (199Oa, 92) calls this the “vampire approach” to dealing with tax shelters: “In order 
to be safe when dealing with a vampire, one drives a stake through the heart, hangs a cross around 
the neck, places a mirror over the eyes, and fills the coffin with wolfsbane.” 
34. For example, the Wall Street Journal of 8 February 1985 repeatedly refers to the “Treasury’s 
tax-simplification plan” and then defines the concept as “drastic tax-rate reduction for individuals 
and businesses coupled with elimination of a host of tax preferences.” 204  Don Fullerton 
were using complexity to avoid their fair share of tax. With nice simple digits 
like 10-10-10,  10-5-3,  or 15-25-35  appearing throughout the decade, one 
might think that a reform needs to be, not simplification,  but simple minded. 
The first theme of this paper is the supply-side logic of personal marginal 
rate reductions. Rates were reduced not just in 1981 but again in 1986. Presi- 
dent Reagan was able to leave office with the top marginal rate less than half 
what it was when he started. Some economic effects of these changes are ana- 
lyzed in papers appearing in Slemrod (1990). Impoftant associated effects on 
the distribution of tax burdens are not discussed much here, but evidence on 
the 1981 changes is debated in U.S. Congressional  Budget Office (1987), U.S. 
House of Representatives (1990), and Lindsey (1990). 
The second theme of this paper is the impact of deficits on the process of 
tax policy-making. Lawmakers now pay much attention to estimates of revenue 
impact. For a number of reasons, it seems like too much attention. First, each 
revenue estimate is only an estimate. It is an imperfect best guess made by an 
arbitrarily assigned estimator who uses old data, a set of arbitrary assumptions, 
and error-prone computer calculations.  A different estimator could easily make 
other reasonable assumptions  and get a different answer. Second, these revenue 
estimates are always relative to existing law, as if  that were some valuable 
standard against which to judge all changes. There is nothing absolute about 
current law, for that is why changes are being considered in the first place. An 
example is the way that any indexing proposal appears to lose billions of dol- 
lars, relative to the tyranny of current law, when in fact inflation under current 
law might be raising billions of dollars of revenue more than was intended (see 
McLure 1986,1645). Third, other good reasons to enact some tax change may 
be overwhelmed by the estimate of a revenue loss, given the difficulty of reduc- 
ing each dollar of deficit. Fourth, the process has established five-year budget 
periods of absolute importance. Four years doesn’t matter, or six years, or any 
kind of present value calculation. The process becomes incredible when mi- 
nute details of several small provisions that each add $200 million of revenue 
are combined to pay for a big provision that costs tens of billions, with a rea- 
sonable error of plus or minus one or two billion. 
These criticisms are quite valid, but what is the alternative? The process 
absolutely needs some kind of  discipline. As Senator Pat Moynihan of  the 
Finance Committee puts it, “Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not 
his own facts” (Birnbaum and Murray 1987, 275). There is no free lunch, and 
policymakers need a common language for communicating about the neces- 
sary trade-offs among alternatives. Indeed, the tax reform process really started 
working properly only when the “core” group of  senators came out of  their 
closed room not just with a new low-rate proposal but with a rule that amend- 
ments themselves must each be revenue neutral. Any lawmaker who wants 
some tax break must, for the first time, recognize its cost in terms of  some 
other added tax. For another example, consider the differences in legitimate 
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estimates are not even the same sign, let alone the same magnitude. When the 
rate was raised in 1986, the revenue estimate was positive. Later, other esti- 
mates showed that a reduction in the capital gains rate would raise revenue. 
Either is possible, but  not both. The government cannot raise revenue by 
raising the capital gains rate and then raise more revenue by lowering it again. 
The procedures to provide and use revenue estimates can undoubtedly be im- 
proved, but, in the era of deficits, their importance is here to stay. 
The last theme of this paper is the level playing field. Certainly, the equity 
version of the level playing field had a role in making sure that individuals in 
the same income group could not end up with very different tax burdens owing 
to shelters. This more populist version just happened to support the efficiency 
version that called for more equal marginal effective tax rates on different 
assets. Such calculations were popular in the early 1980s, but Merrill (1987) 
discusses several reasons that these economic models were of only limited 
importance to the actual policy debate. One such model, however, was used 
not only in academic research to evaluate alternative proposals in the early 
1980s (see Fullerton and Henderson 1984)  but also within the Treasury depart- 
ment to evaluate successive reform options in 1985-86 and later as the basis 
for calculations appearing in the Economic Report of  the President in 1987 
(pp. 87-90)  and again in 1989 (pp. 92-93). 
Looking over the decade of tax policy in the making, a question frequently 
asked is whether the Tax  Reform Act of  1986 (TRA) was a reversal of  the 
Economic Recovery Tax  Act of  1981. When asked this very question, most 
interviewees responded immediately, “Yes, it was a reversal.” Where ERTA 
accelerated depreciation and expanded the ITC, the  1986 act slowed down 
depreciation and repealed the ITC. One bill greatly reduced corporate taxes; 
the other greatly increased them. Then, after further reflection, or prompting 
from the interviewer, most added, “Well, I suppose that personal rate reduction 
was one aspect similar in the two bills.” A significant minority of interviewees 
responded immediately, “No, it was not a reversal.” Some thought that debates 
about both ERTA and TRA had an unusual concern with the structure of taxa- 
tion (e.g., indexing) and not just revenues.3J  Others pointed immediately to the 
similarity of the rate reduction.36 
To  the extent that TRA did reverse ERTA, via depreciation allowances and 
corporate taxes, the reversal did not start with the 1986 bill. The more im- 
35. Before Congress on  18 February 1981, in support of  ERTA, Reagan said that “the taxing 
power of government . . .  must not be used to regulate the economy or bring about social change.” 
The same logic applied to TRA and the level playing field. 
36. This question is addressed specifically by Fullerton and Mackie (1989). They measure the 
efficiency effects of both ERTA and TRA by using a simulation model that incorporates the inter- 
temporal distoxtion of higher taxes on capital and the interasset distortion of differing effective tax 
rates. They find that, if one adopts the ‘‘new view” (that personal taxes on dividends are unimport- 
ant disincentives), then the reduced tax on capital in ERTA is more important for overall efficiency. 
But, if one adopts the “old view” (that personal taxes on dividends are important investment disin- 
centives), then the level playing field and additional rate reduction in TRA are more important. 206  Don Fullerton 
portant bill as a watershed in tax policy-making was the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of  1981. The powerful forces of “supply-side” thoughts about incen- 
tives and rate reduction began with the 1981 bill. Indexing of brackets and the 
resulting “era of deficits” started with the 1981 bill. And the process of using 
the tax code to encourage or reward particular economic activities through 
various tax provisions culminated in the  1981 bill. Forever after, projected 
deficits (shown in table 3.3 above) required that these provisions be cut back 
or repealed. This new era of tax policy was in effect as of August 1981, but its 
first products were not evident until TEFRA in  1982 and DEFRA in  1984. 
These bills closed loopholes, slowed depreciation,  and started to level the play- 
ing field. By  1986, in these respects, the Tax Reform Act of  1986 was simply 
more of the same. 
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2.  Charls E. Walker 
I believe that the “why” (or the politics) of federal tax policy in the 1980s can 
best be explained in terms of three fundamental factors: (1) significant swings 
in what I call the pendulum of U.S. tax policy; (2) still another demonstration 
of  the convention political science wisdom that presidents of  one party can 209  Tax Policy 
often achieve policy goals that presidents of the other party cannot, goals that 
appear on the surface at least to be contradictory to the party’s philosophy, 
culture, and/or constituencies; and (3) the emergence of  a huge, politically 
intransigent federal deficit. 
I shall deal with these factors out of  order, starting first with the budget 
crunch. Don Fullerton has provided a good discussion of this factor in his back- 
ground paper, so my remarks shall be supplemental and deal primarily with 
the politics of tax policy. 
Tax Policy to Raise Revenue 
Inasmuch as the fundamental purpose of a nation’s tax system is to provide 
revenue, it may seem strange to single out this factor for special treatment with 
respect to the 1980s. The point is not that revenue raising is not essential but 
rather that it came largely to drive tax policy in the United States after 1981. 
The (misnamed) Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of  1982 (TEFRA) 
was a valiant if  only partially successful effort to bring down the mounting 
federal deficit that emerged as a result of the spending and tax policies of the 
early Reagan years. Fullerton has given us a good blow by blow on TEFRA. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the emergence of revenue impact as 
the major driving force in tax  policy-at  least to “outsiders” (both outside and 
within the Congress) trying to affect policy-was  that the professional  revenue 
estimators on the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) (and, to a 
lesser extent, at the Treasury’s Office of Tax Analysis [OTA]), and the members 
to whom they responded, became of overwhelming importance in any debate 
over specific  tax provisions. 
In one instance involving a Walker Associates client during the debate on 
and markup of TEFRA, we were almost certain that our proposed substitution 
for a very tough provision (from the client’s standpoint)  would at least be reve- 
nue neutral. The JCT reported otherwise, and we were not allowed to look into 
the staff‘s  “little black box” and examine the assumptions and analysis that 
blew our proposal out of the water. The fundamental merit of our proposal was 
not even debated; we were killed by a staff revenue estimate. That is not good 
tax policy, and it is not fair.’ 
Is there an answer to this problem? In my judgment, the revenue estimators 
have much more power than they should have in our democratic system. It is 
the members who legally possess final power over revenue estimates (as my 
friend Russell Long demonstrated in the capital gains fight of 1978). One solu- 
tion would be to emulate public policy in other difficult, technical areas and 
1. The JCT staff has finally been more forthcoming-at  least on one issue. It recently shared 
with the world at large its assumptions  and analysis on revenue estimates during the recent capital 
gains debate. That’s progress-although  I think that the JCT staff estimates of the revenue impact 
of a capital gains cut are still too conservative, especially if scored on an overall macroeconomic 
basis. 210  Charls E. Walker 
transfer revenue estimating to an outside panel of carefully selected nongov- 
ernment  economists-short  of  that,  to  set  up  a  “National  Academy  of 
Science”-type nonpartisan panel of experts to review and critique the JCT and 
OTA revenue-estimating procedures. Neither of these steps seems to be even 
remotely close to the horizon. 
Three other political points about tax policy and the budget crunch should 
be noted before I turn to the other two factors affecting tax policy in the 1980s. 
One involves decision making in Congress, the second relates to the basic 
forces to which Congress was responding, and the third shows how a voter 
uprising can quickly force Congress to reverse an earlier unpopular tax de- 
cision. 
During his years as chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Russell 
Long did all that he could to promote tax decisions on a collegial, consensus 
basis. This approach had a great deal going for it, especially during years in 
which, more often than not, we operated under divided government, with all its 
inherent difficulties. Partisan factors tend to be minimized under this approach. 
But, when the new chairman of the committee, Bob Dole, began his effort 
to push through TEFRA in 1982, collegiality was thrown out the window. I 
don’t say this to be critical of Bob Dole. I haven’t talked to him about it, but I 
suppose that he simply wanted to get the job done, quickly, and without a lot 
of  talk-perhaps  Russell can enlighten us on that. In any event, the eleven 
Republicans on the committee would meet in private caucus, Dole would cut 
a deal, and the group would emerge (in most instances) as a solid phalanx, in 
effect telling the Democratic members, “Take it or else.”  It worked. But, not 
only did it make tax legislation less “fun,” it also probably helped move us 
toward the excessive partisanship that finally emerged this fall in the efforts to 
construct an effective deficit-reduction package. If  that’s so, it’s too bad. We 
direly need ways to make divided government work well today, as it did during 
the years of Eisenhower and even Nixon.2 
My  second political point involves the frequently made statement that the 
passage of  TEFRA in a congressional election year proves that the need to 
bring down a mounting deficit can be a driving force in tax policy, causing 
members to vote against their constituents’ desires. Not so. TEFRA passed, 
not because of  the emerging deficit per se, but because the media convinced 
2. This is neither the time nor the place to discuss the basic factors that have led to the budget 
fiasco of  1990. But I must note that the Economist  seemed to me to be on the right track when it 
recently nokd (after calling the summit agreement a “mouse”) that one of the basic problems is 
that the U.S. system of government was invented 200 years ago and might not be quite suitable for 
the present-or  at least need some significant changes. I strongly agree. The Founding Fathers, 
for good reasons at the time, insisted on checks and balances and a weak executive. Now that we 
have moved so far toward that type of plebiscite democracy that the Founding Fathers distrusted, 
with members voting more and more their constituents’ desires even when they know they’re 
wrong, the chief executive needs more power in the budget arena. Once he sends up his budget, 
he’s  technically “out of play” (unless he can motivate voters directly through his bully pulpit and 
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the voting public that the sky-high interest rates and collapsing stock market 
of 1981-82  were caused by the deficit-staunch  the red ink, and the pain of 
ultra high borrowing costs and shrinking net worth would disappear. 
If this view is correct-and  you know that it is-then  we can understand 
why nothing other than an inadequate weapon known as Gramm-Rudman- 
Hollings was used to attack the deficit until 1990, when George Bush decided 
(too late?) that he had better reconfigure his lips and get deficit reduction mov- 
ing or else he would seriously injure his prospects for reelection in 1992. And, 
sad to state, when he made that move last May, and since that time, the “non- 
pain” federal deficit has continued to rise, thus dooming the chance to get a 
solid deficit-reduction plan voted by Congress only shortly before the 1990 
election. As one member said in speaking against the first package, “Are we 
supposed to vote for legislation which includes our own death warrants?’ 
Good question. 
A second reason that TEiFRA passed Congress in an election year is that it 
primarily hit corporations, not individuals. The biggest  individual revenue 
raiser in the legislation  was mandatory withholding of income taxes on interest 
and  dividends-a  provision  on  which,  as noted  below, Congress quickly 
turned tail. To be sure, everyone “knows” that people, not institutions, ulti- 
mately bear all taxes, but that knowledge seems to count for little in the politi- 
cal arena. In Russell’s famous dictum of tax reform-“Don’t  tax you; don’t tax 
me; tax that fellow behind that tree!”-the  “fellow behind that tree” is fre- 
quently a faceless corporation. 
My third political point about TEFRA is the just-noted and, to some, aston- 
ishing reversal of Congress on the TEFRA provision to force withholding of 
taxes on interest and dividends. That reversal didn’t  surprise me at all, and I 
doubt that it surprised Russell; we had gone through almost exactly the same 
thing in 1962. Withholding had passed the House as part of John Kennedy’s 
“tax reform” efforts, but it went down the tube in the Senate (and Congress) 
as a result of a very effective (but dishonest) publicity campaign mounted by 
the U.S. Savings and Loan League. As executive vice president of the Ameri- 
can Bankers Association at the time, and fresh out of the Treasury, I refused to 
join the league in the campaign-partly  because the ads were dishonest, partly 
resolution appears before him-a  measure that he must sign or literally bring the government to 
a halt. 
I’m not sure that I favor the line-item veto; it will not help in the crucial area of entitlements, 
could give an LBJ-type president huge power in bringing congressmen “around,” and might impair 
national security policy when and if an overly “dovish” man or woman (e.g., George McGovem) 
occupies the presidency at a time when new weapons systems need to be developed. At the least, 
however, the president should have restored to him the recession and impoundment powers taken 
away in the Budget Control Act of 1974. Furthermore, can we not come up with some innovative 
but politically acceptable methods for the president, representing all the people, to exercise at least 
some control over growth of  entitlements? I refer that tough question to Charles Schultze and 
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because I knew that they would kill withholding without the presence of orga- 
nized banking’s  fingerprint^.^ 
There are millions upon millions of voters who own savings accounts, re- 
ceive dividends, and so on, and they detest the idea of withholding. The spon- 
sors of withholding in 1982 like to blame the bankers and savings and loans 
(S&Ls) for the repeal of  the provision in 1983. The banks and S&Ls might 
have speeded the process, but permanent withholding was not in the cards from 
the start. In fact, the banks and S&Ls did the politicians a favor by helping 
force its repeal before  it could go into effect. 
Events in 1989 demonstrate that powerful taxpayer uprisings can still carry 
the day and force reversals of earlier legislation. Cases in point are the provi- 
sion of  the Tax  Reform Act of  1986 (TFU) that affected employee benefit 
programs (sec. 89), reversed as a result of a voter uprising (mainly small busi- 
nesses), and the catastrophic health provisions enacted in 1988, shot down in 
flames by the elderly only a year later. 
All in all, a revenue-driven tax policy can make life miserable for almost all 
parties-legislators,  Treasury officials, interest groups, lobbyists, the whole 
crowd. Only the revenue estimators seem to prosper and perhaps be happy at 
such times. 
The Tax Policy Pendulum 
Let me begin to illustrate what I mean by the tax policy pendulum by quot- 
ing the final examination question on tax policy for my graduate students at 
the University of Texas at Austin last semester: 
In enacting the Tax  Reform Act of  1976, Congress tried to move the tax 
system toward its image of  “fairness” by raising taxes on business and on 
high-income individuals who enjoyed large capital gains. Only two years 
later, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1978, which did just the opposite 
by  cutting corporate tax  rates, making  “permanent” the investment tax 
credit, and-by  means of the Bill SteigerlRussell  Long amendment-slash- 
ing taxes on capital gains. 
Less than a year later, in the summer of  1979, Representatives James R. 
Jones (who had authored the House version of  the 1978 bill) and Barber 
Conable, accompanied by such Senate worthies as Lloyd Bentsen, Gaylord 
Nelson, Bob Packwood, Jack Danforth, and Jack Heinz, introduced the “10- 
5-3” capital cost recovery bill, which, if  passed, would cut corporate tax 
3. Those of us who like to think of ourselves as politically astute frequently quote taxi drivers 
to make our points-and,  indeed, it was a New York taxi driver who made the telling comment 
on withholding to me in  1962. When he found that I spent considerable time in Washington on 
legislative matters, he said, “Do you know what that damn John  Kennedy is trying to do to me- 
and, to think, I voted for the guy?’  “No,” I replied. “What is that damn Kennedy trying to  do to 
you?” “He’s trying to pass a law that will take some of my money out of my savings account.” 
“But don’t you realize that you owe that money as taxes to Uncle Sam?”  His response was short 
and telling: “Like hell I do!” 213  Tax Policy 
liabilities in half within five years. In less than six weeks, over 300 House 
members and some seventy-five senators had signed onto the legislation. 
Its significant features were enacted in  1981 as part of President Reagan’s 
Economic Recovery Tax Act. 
Finally, in 1986, Congress passed a Tax Reform Act, which repealed the 
investment tax credit; lengthened depreciation guidelines; eliminated the 
preferential tax on capital gains; sharply limited the individual retirement 
account provisions passed originally in 1981; and greatly reduced the attrac- 
tiveness of “tax shelters.” 
Explain. 
(Oh, how I hated that type of question in my graduate days. “Explain,” indeed!) 
What were student answers that I did not accept? That federal tax policy 
is simply and for no good reason unpredictable, swinging erratically with no 
discernible pattern. Or that Congress acted with uncharacteristic good sense 
and courage in 1976 and again in 1986, repulsing the greedy “Gucci Gulch” 
lobbyists in order to make the tax system “fair.” Or, vice versa, that the good 
sense and courage was demonstrated in the 1978 and 1981 bills. None of these 
answers gained a passing grade. 
The answer that I did accept was that the “pendulum” of U.S. tax policy had 
repeated past performance, making a one and a half swing from the “fairness” 
objective, which is fueled by voters’ unhappiness with what they view as an 
unfair and oppressive federal income tax-to  tax policy oriented toward eco- 
nomic goals-and  back to “fairness” again. Let me explain in terms of my 
personal experience with U.S. tax policy. 
Although my presence on the Washington scene runs back almost four de- 
cades, my  direct concern with taxes began only in 1961, when the Treasury 
moved administratively to liberalize certain depreciation guidelines and John 
Kennedy proposed the investment tax credit (ITC) to Congress. Interestingly, 
JFK’s call for the ITC “to get the country moving again” (one of  his major 
campaign themes) and to enhance U.S. “international competitiveness” (yes, 
even then) was opposed by both the labor and the business communities. The 
American Bankers Association was  a major exception; we  applauded and 
worked for the ITC; I personally testified for it before Congress. Congress 
somewhat reluctantly approved it in 1962. 
These first steps toward what I would call a pro-capital  formation tax policy 
(which might now be called supply-side), strongly oriented toward economic 
goals, were followed by  what was surely a major “supply-side” proposal in 
early 1963, when JFK called for slashes in both business and individual taxes, 
the latter closely resembling the Kemp-Roth tax cut of the late 1970s. The tax 
measure was bogged down in the Senate Finance Committee at the time of 
JFK’s assassination, but LBJ broke it loose, and Congress enacted the bill in 
1964. 
The point here, as related to the pendulum of tax policy, is that the original 
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(defined solely in terms of  “fairness”), in the image of, and prepared by, the 
dean of all such ‘‘reformers,’’ Treasury Assistant Secretary Stanley Surrey!  The 
“reform” portion of JFKs proposal collided with the growth section, and, not 
surprisingly, growth won. After all, JFK had indeed promised “to get the coun- 
try moving again.” Add to that the skill and pragmatism of his Treasury team 
of Doug Dillon and Joe Fowler and the recognition by Council of Economic 
Advisers (CEA) Chairman Walter Heller and his associates that tax policy for 
growth was indeed important-well,  economics won, and “reform” lost. As 
Russell will recall, JFK promptly dropped the reform elements from his pack- 
age when they showed signs of dragging the whole bill down. 
JFK could do this, without major political damage, because the “tax reform” 
crowd at the AFL-CIO, along with Stan Surrey and his disciples, would doubt- 
less be sullen, but not really mutinous. Here we get close to the final factor in 
1980s tax policy that I shall discuss below-what  a president of one party can 
do that a president of the other cannot. More important in this instance, how- 
ever, was the fact that, in 1963-64, the public was not nearly so unhappy with 
the federal income tax system as it later became. Bracket creep was still far 
down the road, tax shelters had not become a national scandal, and stories 
about big corporations or millionaires paying little or no federal taxes were not 
as yet front-page news. 
By the time I took my second seat at the Treasury in January 1969-indeed, 
I should say that at almost precisely the time I took it-public  unhappiness 
with the income tax almost exploded. Outgoing Democratic Treasury Secre- 
tary Joe Barr had done his successors the “favor” of telling Congress that many 
multimillionaires or even billionaires were paying little or no federal income 
taxes. At the same time, Stan Surrey’s comprehensive swan song tax reform 
proposal was publicly released (rather than privately handed to  US).^ 
The news of millionaires paying little or no federal income taxes rocketed 
around the country. A staffer told me that the Treasury received more gripe 
mail about income taxes in February 1969, following the Barr revelations in 
January, than in all of 1968. The ranking Republican on the House Ways and 
4. I use quotation marks when referring to “tax reform” because, as Webster tells us, “reform” 
means “to amend or improve by change of form or removal of faults.” “Tax reform” that makes a 
system “fairer” (in someone’s image) by,  e.g.,  raising taxes on saving and investment may cause 
the economy to falter and unemployment to rise-a  policy that can surely be viewed as “unfair.” 
Unfortunately, in my view, the “fairness” gang captured the high rhetorical ground a long time 
ago. When those in the media speak of  “tax reform,” they are almost always buying “fairness” as 
reform’s sole ingredient. A strong case can be made that, in a fundamental sense, the Kennedy- 
Johnson tax measures of 1961-1964,  the Jones-Steiger-Long bill of  1978, and the Economic Re- 
covery Tax  Act  of  1981-all  strongly pr-apital  formation,  pro-jobs,  pro-growth,  and pro- 
competitiveness-deserve  the label reform no less than the 1969, 1976, and 1986 tax acts. 
5.  LBJ, who could be devious, had promised AFL-CIO head George Meany that, if organized 
labor would support his proposal for a 10 percent income surtax in the spring of 1968, he would 
send a true “tax reform” proposal to Congress before he left office in Jaaary 1969. Surrey worked 
hard and long and brought forth an ambitious plan, but LBJ kept it bottled up-until  only a few 
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Means Committee, a fine politician and wonderful human being named John 
Byrnes, prepared a hard-hitting, pro-“tax reform” speech for delivery about 
that time, but shared it in advance with Committee Chairman Wilbur Mills- 
only to find that Wilbur in effect stole his speech and gave it first! 
I believed all along that the “tax reform” pressure might die out, as it usually 
had in the past-until  15 April. When the typical taxpayer got to the bottom 
of his return and saw that he had to add LBJ’s surtax to what he already consid- 
ered a tax bill much too high-he  exploded again. As a result, during 1969, 
Treasury officials and staff, tax committees and staff, and many others worked 
night and day to produce the Tax  Reform Act of  1969, up to that time the 
shining example of “tax reform” defined in terms of fairness. 
Wonder of wonders-that  bill was largely put together in a Republican trea- 
sury (drawing, of  course, from Stan Surrey’s plan) and was signed by  none 
other than Richard Nixon. Nixon could succeed where JFK could not-an- 
other example of my third element of tax policy, discussed below. 
Tax policy swung back toward the goal of economic growth only two years 
later, a move ushered in by the recession of  1970. With the economy weak, 
inflation mounting, and convertibility of the dollar into gold becoming harder 
to maintain, Nixon announced his New Economic Policy in August 197  1. In 
addition to cutting the link between gold and the dollar and  a wage-price 
freeze, the president asked Congress for restoration of the ITC, which had been 
repealed in the “tax reform” flurry of  1969, and statutory approval of  a new 
depreciation system known as the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR).6 These 
two actions, both of which Congress approved, provided the United States with 
a creditable and fairly competitive capital cost recovery ~ystem.~ 
The tax policy pendulum moved little in the first half of the 1970s, but, by 
6. Earlier, in 1965, the ITC had been “suspended.” Congress quickly reactivated it in  1966 as 
investment spending dropped sharply. 
7. Once in a very long while, a tough legislative goal can be achieved with a single argument 
presented on a single piece of paper; such was the case with the restoration of the ITC and the 
enactment of  ADR in the fall of  1971. Sophisticated financiaUpolitical reporters had told me, 
“Walker, you’ll never get both ITC and ADR. Which will you settle for?” Sounding perhaps more 
optimistic than I really felt, I simply said, “Just you watch-it’s  a piece of cake!” 
Educating Congress with respect to international  competitiveness  was the key (just as it is likely 
to be a big part of the next swing of the tax policy pendulum back to economic goals). Treasury tax 
staff had prepared what was in effect a “present value” table of the capital cost recovery systems  in 
Japan, Western Europe, and the United States. The AFL-CIO, then very powerful in Congress, 
had swung from its traditional free trade position toward protectionism,  and Congress was uptight 
about foreign competition and the “export of jobs.” Our capital cost recovery table showed that, 
even if both the ITC and ADR were approved, our system, in competitive terms, would still fall 
far short of the Japanese and Western European systems. Representative James Burke, who had 
been the AFL-CIO stalking horse in introducing a blatantly protectionist tax bill known as the 
Burke-Hartke Act, said in executive session of the Ways and Means Committee, “I’m with Charly 
on this. He’s convinced  me that we need both of these measures.” Russell may recall our successful 
use of the table later in his committee. 
Nothing at all was said about whether these business tax cuts were or were not fair. The mem- 
bers, reflecting their constituents concerns, were much more interested in jobs, growth, and com- 
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1976, “tax reform” was again center stage, culminating in the Tax Reform Act 
of  1976. Work on the measure began in the summer of 1975, under new Ways 
and Means Committee Chairman A1  Ullman and before a much-expanded 
group. According to reports from reliable sources, AFL-CIO President George 
Meany had insisted that the House Democrats “stack” the Ways and Means 
Committee by  adding some eleven or twelve members, from the traditional 
twenty-five to thirty-six or thirty-seven. The goal was to get a comprehensive 
“tax reform” bill. The main result was agony for A1 Ullman, for the expanded 
committee was ideologically split right down the middle. Consensus, or even 
near consensus, was impossible. 
Nevertheless, A1  Ullman pushed  ahead and ultimately succeeded in ob- 
taining passage a year later of the Tax Reform Act of  1976. Perhaps its most 
spectacular “reform” was to attack the alleged problem of nontaxation of capi- 
tal gains at death by  requiring the original basis of inherited property to be 
carried over to the heir. Once middle America’s farmers and small businessmen 
found out about this action, they rose up (as with withholding in 1962), and 
the provision was repealed even before it went into effect. 
Then came the first of two spectacular swings in the tax policy pendulum: 
the passage of the Jim Jones-Bill  Steiger-Russell Long-devised Revenue Act 
in  1978; the overwhelming congressional endorsement of “10-5-3”  when in- 
troduced in the summer of  1979; and the ultimate passage of the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of  1981 (ERTA), which gave the United States one of the 
most competitive capital cost recovery systems in the industrial world. 
How to explain this swing of  the pendulum? There were several factors. 
Business groups and some academics in the early 1970s had begun to warn 
that the United States faced a capital shortage, and various studies tended to 
point in that direction. Senators Lloyd Bentsen and Bill Brock mounted hear- 
ings to study the issue, concluding that a problem did indeed exist. Brookings 
undertook such a study, and it is with the reporting of that study to the House 
Ways and Means Committee that I began to feel that the tide was beginning to 
turn in the direction of a pro-capital formation policy. 
At a hearing in July 1975, the late Joe Pechman told Ways and Means that 
Brookings-where  Joe was then director of economic studies-had  engaged 
a distinguished panel of experts, which had concluded that the United States 
would have no capital shortage problem in the future provided that we do two 
things: restore full employment and convert the federal deficit into a surplus. 
Whereupon Representative Bill Frenzel, a “legislator’s legislator,” all-around 
fine person, and world-class “doodler,” dropped his pencil and exclaimed, 
“What did you just say?’  Joe repeated his statement and asked, “Does that 
conclusion surprise you,  Congressman?’  Frenzel replied, “Surprised? I’m 
flabbergasted. You have just convinced me that we have a very big capital for- 
mation problem!” 
By 1975, when Joe testified, the various studies and discussions of a capital 
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cent of the nation’s “thought leaders” polled by the Opinion Research Corpora- 
tion (ORC) believed that there was a looming investment shortage and that, 
“over the next ten years or so,” it would be “somewhat serious” (30 percent), 
or “very serious” (8 percent). Even more significantly, an identical 78 percent 
of  the federal legislators polled by  the ORC came to the same conclusion. 
Moreover, by a ratio of 50 to 38 percent, federal legislators stated that existing 
tax laws hurt capital formation. By 1976, according to the Cambridge Report, 
60 percent of the general public believed that there was “a problem with raising 
the dollars needed for business investment.” 
So, understandably and inevitably, the tax policy pendulum began to swing 
from “tax reform for fairness” to “tax reform for jobs, growth, and competi- 
tiveness.’’ The American people, and therefore Congress, had concluded that 
the U.S. economy was not performing up to snuff and that the tax system had 
a great deal to do with that. The result was the strongly pro-capital formation 
tax bills of  1978 and 1981. And, since pro-capital formation tax legislation 
means reducing the hit on saving and investment, tax “benefits” (as scored by 
the Joint Tax Committee) can be said to flow to the upper-income rather than 
to the lower-income citizens. The answer on this to the “tax reform by fairness” 
crowd is that there is nothing “fair” about rising unemployment and lagging 
growth in living standards. What “tax reformers” refer to in pejorative terms 
as trickle-down economics (still a favorite of the Washington  Post)  can also be 
called capital formution economics, which almost everybody agrees is essen- 
tial to achieving higher per capita income and thus expanding living standards. 
In speaking to groups about this phenomenon, I was prone to say that, in the 
1970s, capital formation became “as American as apple pie”-until  my friend 
George Will returned from a trip to California and told me of a sign on a fast- 
food place advertising “kosher burritos.” Now what, asked George, could be 
more American than kosher burritos? What indeed! I changed my line. In the 
198Os, capital formation became as American as kosher burritos. But, alas and 
alack, the pendulum was soon to swing back again, and with great vigor, cul- 
minating in the Tax Reform Act of  1986 (TRA). 
I have a love-hate relationship with that legislation. I “love” the low individ- 
ual and corporate rates, something I never thought I would see in my lifetime. 
But I “hate” the more than $150 billion, five-year “hit” on capital formation 
that in effect paid for those low rates (plus other “goodies” distributed by this 
“revenue-neutral” legislation). Worst of all, of course, was repeal of the ITC. 
That action, coupled with lengthening of  depreciation guidelines, raised the 
capital cost of investing in new equipment by 41 percent, when viewed from 
the standpoint of the investor, and by 13 percent, when viewed from the stand- 
point of the user, which includes depreciation. For the entire period after 1981, 
the relevant figures are 90 percent and 23 percent, respectively.8 
8. See the testimony of Mark  Bloomfield before the House Ways and Means Committee (10lst 
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From an economic standpoint, worse tax action for a nation whose capital 
costs had already been driven too high by  the upward pressure of  the huge 
federal deficit on domestic real interest rates can hardly be imagined. John 
Paulus, then chief economist for Goldman Sachs, wrote in the Washington  Post 
that the tax bill would have been near perfect-for  Japan. Martin Feldstein 
was also very critical of the anti-capital formation parts of the legislation. Our 
purpose today, however, is to discuss not the wisdom of the decade’s tax policy 
but how it happened? 
The 1986 TRA was partly the result of the tax policy pendulum swinging 
back toward “tax reform for fairness,” for the American people by  1985 had 
become very angry with the federal income tax.  Not only did they crave sim- 
plicity in order better to understand the system as a whole as well as to stay 
away from the tax preparer, but they were also furious with reports of  rich 
individuals  .and big corporations who paid little or no taxes. Still, such unhap- 
9. Still, I cannot resist taking substantive issue with Fullerton. I believe that his statement that 
“Treasury I” would have “leveled the playing field” of tax policy for business investment omits an 
aspect of tax neutrality that is crucial to promoting capital formation. While it is indeed true that 
equality of tax rates on the income from all three types of business investment (structures, equip- 
ment, and inventories) will tend to result in what the economists call eficcient allocation of re- 
sources in the present, the existence of  an income tax inherently promotes misallocation of re- 
sources over time. We  know that the personal income tax is in effect a double tax on saving; it 
taxes the income from which saving is generated and at the same time taxes the proceeds of such 
saving. And we  add to this double tax on saving still a third layer, a tax on corporations. The 
result-as  is widely recognized-is  a tax system that promotes consumption  and is biased against 
saving and investment. 
By raising taxes on the latter, TRA in fact made the playing field more uneven. The bias of the 
income tax can be eliminated by substituting  a consumption  tax, such as a value-added tax (VAT), 
for the business income tax or by moving the latter toward a consumed income tax by cutting back 
on the taxation of saving and investment. Given the political inevitability of the corporate income 
tax, this was the policy route that we took with ERTA  in  1981-and,  from the standpoint of 
economic progress, a very good route in my book. 
When we “corporate lobbyists” conceived of “10-5-3”  in 1979 (actually, it was more the cre- 
ation of Representative  Jim Jones, based on an earlier business group proposal known as “10-5”), 
we wanted to bring the tax treatment of investment on equipment as close to theoretical expensing 
as possible, as under a neutral VAT.  Given the high discount rates that existed at the time, we hit 
very close to our target period. As interest rates fell, however, the combination of short deprecia- 
tion lives and a 10 percent ITC shifted the rate to a theoretically negative level, to what might be 
called a “subsidy” for tax-paying corporations (or those who temporarily took advantage  of “safe- 
harbor leasing”). 
But I do not apologize for this “subsidy.” As DeLong and Summers (1991) tell us so convinc- 
ingly in a study covering a cross section of nations, investment in equipment is indeed the key to 
stronger economic growth in mature economies and to more rapid development in less-advanced 
economies.  DeLong and Summers  conclude that investment of 1 percent of gross domestic  product 
(GDP) in equipment is associated with a third of a percentage point increase in the overall growth 
rate of overall GDP-a  very substantial rate of return. 
To  me, the case for expensing all business investment is strong, and it is even stronger for 
expensing investment in productive equipment-and  I would risk a theoretical “tax subsidy” to 
that end. If that is industrial policy, then so be it. 
Incidentally, Fullerton is dead wrong when he says that JFKs  original ITC was not conceived as 
industrial policy but was intended as a temporary macroeconomic  tool used to stimulate aggregate 
demand. Just the opposite was true (if the public statements of JFK and his aides are to be be- 
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piness had not in the past broken out so strongly as to support so massive a 
revision of the tax law (a trillion-dollar crap shoot, as Dave Stockman said to 
me). Indispensable to the whole process was the presence in the White House 
of a popular Republican president who was really dedicated to getting individ- 
ual tax rates down, even at the cost of raising the very corporate tax burden that 
for many years he had condemned as an unnecessary and unwise appendage to 
our federal tax system.’O 
This, of course, brings us to the final factor conditioning U.S. tax policy in 
the 1980s. 
What Presidents of One Party Can Do That Those of the Other Cannot 
The most often cited example of a president of one party leading the effort 
to achieve a difficult and perhaps politically divisive policy goal is, of course, 
Nixon’s successful effort to establish relations with Communist China during 
his first term. Conventional political wisdom-and  I think it is correct-is  that 
liberal Democrat Hubert Humphrey, if victorious in 1968, would have faced a 
difficult if not impossible task in that regard. The probability is that he would 
have been roundly attacked and solidly opposed by the Republican Right, a 
group that had “no place else to go” when Nixon moved and-to  repeat the 
phrase-became  sullen but not mutinous. What has not been sufficiently rec- 
ognized is that this same U.S. political characteristic applies to other politically 
divisive policies, including tax policy. 
For example, in the late 1950s, we Republicans in the Eisenhower Treasury 
wanted to mount a campaign in Congress for a pro-growth, pro-capital forma- 
tion, “supply-side” cut in income taxes of  individuals and corporations. But 
the Democratic leadership in Congress said, in effect, ‘‘no way”-in  no way 
10. As late as February 1983, Ronald Reagan told a group of businessmen in Boston that the 
corporate tax was (my words) a dumb, lousy tax and ought to be eliminated. As both he and I have 
said thousands of times, “Corporations  don’t pay taxes; people do. And the fact is that the corporate 
tax is a hidden tax of the worst type, for nobody knows who really pays it. We ought to get rid of 
it.” The press responded to this statement with great relish. But the tempest died quickly when (as 
George Will put it) Reagan’s aides made it crystal  clear that he was not speaking  for his administra- 
tion. Fullerton has noted Regan’s statement in 1985 that reflected his earlier position-but  this was 
before Don  Regan had much of an opportunity,  as the new chief of staff, to convince the president 
that “the higher business taxes would just hit those companies paying too little now.” 
Interestingly enough, Ronald Reagan has some pretty heavy academics backing him up. My 
favorite quote in this respect comes from Arnold  Harberger, viewed by many as the foremost 
academic expert on the corporate income tax. At a conference in 1983, he said, “There is no sound 
economic underpinning for the corporation income tax.  The tax originated because corporations 
are legal persons-but  so too are three-year-olds,  eighty-five-year-olds,  manic depressives,  blonds, 
and idiots. Why select out this particular class of legal person as the object of special (and harsh) 
taxation? There is no respectable economic answer to this question.” The conclusion must be that 
the corporate income tax is a bad tax. I am therefore puzzled as to why so many economists (and 
lawyers) devote many hours of study and effort to bringing internal “rationality” to the tax. Even 
if  all rates were equalized on all investment all the time, it would still be a bad tax that exists 
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was it possible for a Democratic Congress to agree to the tax reductions on 
upper-income individuals and corporations that such a proposal would have to 
include. But, lo and behold, that’s precisely what John F.  Kennedy proposed in 
1961-63  and a Democratic Congress approved in 1962 and 1964. 
Even so, as already noted, JFK had to drop “tax reform” from his proposal; 
even a Democratic Congress was not going to buy that. Eight years later, how- 
ever, a Republican Treasury devised-and  a reluctant Nixon approved-what 
up to that time was the high-water mark in “tax reform.” To be sure, the Tax 
Reform Act of 1976 was enacted by a Democratic Congress, and I cannot for 
the life of me remember why Gerald Ford did not veto the legislation. But, by 
the “tax reform” standards of 1969 and, later, 1986, it was pretty weak tea. 
There is little doubt that the 1986 act would not have had a snowball’s chance 
in you-know-where if it had not been conceived by a Republican Treasury and 
accepted and pushed by a popular and highly articulate Republican president. 
Not that the Reagan imprimatur was enough-each  of  what I call the “four 
horsemen” of the TRA could be said to have been indispensable to success: 
Reagan; BakerDarman at the Treasury (together they make up one horseman); 
Ways and Means Chairman Danny Rostenkowski; and Senate Finance Chair- 
man Bob Packwood, who, with his top aide, pulled it all together (as Fullerton 
points out) over a bucket of beer. 
The indispensability of these other three horsemen notwithstanding, it was 
a Ronald Reagan production from beginning to end. To drive this point home, 
can anyone conceive of Jimmy Carter pulling off  the same victory? Indeed, 
Carter entered the White House declaiming that the U.S.  income tax system 
was a disgrace and that he would do something about it. When he finally sent 
up his “tax reform” proposals in  1978, they were decidedly weak, with the 
major recommendation to raise taxes on capital gains. Congress did precisely 
the opposite, and very little of Carter’s “tax reform” passed. 
Conclusion 
Martin has told us not to look at the future, and, although I have taken a 
peek or two, I have largely abided by  his wish. But there are of course im- 
portant lessons to be learned from the 1980s experience as we proceed through 
the 1990s. But I supposed that’s another subject for another conference. 
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3. Russell B. Long 
The late John F.  Kennedy used to keep a chart in the Oval Office of the White 
House. It showed the decline of the national debt as a percentage of the gross 
national product under Truman and Eisenhower. Then, during my  years as 
chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, I insisted on obtaining from 
the Treasury an updating of that information. 
Here is what it showed. Our net federal debt was 11  8 percent of the gross 
national product in  1945. Under Truman and Eisenhower, it declined to 46 
percent, less than half. Then, under Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, it declined 
to 25 percent, less than one-quarter of what it was in 1945. 
To be sure, the debt grew in terms of dollars. But, in terms of its relation to 
the gross national product (which represents what we have with which to pay 
both the debt and the interest), it was cut to less than one-quarter. What had 
caused that?-(  1) economic growth, which included (2)  increased productiv- 
ity, (3) high employment, (4) population increase, and (5)  inflation. The in- 
creases in those factors greatly offset the small annual increase in the national 
debt to cause the ratio to go steadily down. 
During the Kennedy-Johnson years, we saw how fiscal policy-using  tax 
cuts and tax credits along with lower rates-could  be used to promote eco- 
nomic  growth. Then, during the  Carter administration, Senator Bill Roth 
started making speeches advocating a 30 percent cut in tax rates-10  percent 
a year each year for three years. In those speeches, he emphasized the experi- 
ence of the Kennedy-Johnson tax cut. Toward the end of the Carter administra- 
tion, Republicans began to coalesce behind the Kemp-Roth 30 percent tax 
cut proposal. 
When President Reagan came into office, he recommended a first-year tax 
cut of about 5 percent (the same magnitude as the Finance Committee bill we 
had recommended in 1980). But he went far beyond that to recommend a fur- 
ther tax cut of another 10 percent in rates to take effect in 1982 and a third tax 
cut of still another 10  percent to take effect in 1983. All this was to be incorpo- 
rated into one gigantic tax cut bill, known as ERTA, the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act. 
Why did he recommend such huge tax cuts? We need go no further than to 
note that, in his campaign, he had recommended a 30 percent across-the-board 
cut in rates, spread evenly across three years-the  Kemp-Roth bill. 
As the former chairman of the Committee on Finance, I was proud of the 
part I played in passing the Kennedy-Johnson tax cut, which had been the 
largest tax cut up to that time and had worked very well. At a minimum, I felt 
that I had to vote to give President Reagan’s bill a try. 
As the bill progressed through the committees and the floor of both Houses, 
it picked up amendments to make it an even greater tax cut than the president 
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Well, it is rather difficult for an administration  (asking for the largest tax cut 
in history) to insist that other suggestions, such as indexing the tax code to 
eliminate the so-called bracket creep, should not also be tried. That is espe- 
cially the case with regard to items that the president has been known to en- 
dorse in previous years. 
Part of the income tax package leveled the top rate on personal income taxa- 
tion to 50 percent, and we provided that 60 percent of a long-term capital gain 
would be excluded from taxation. Thus, the top rate for a “long-term” capital 
gain was reduced to an overall rate of 20 percent. 
Did it bother me that we might be cutting taxes too deeply? Not particularly. 
In previous years, I had voted for large tax cuts and for needed tax increases. 
On two different occasions, I had gone to sitting presidents, President Johnson 
as well as President Nixon, and urged them to recommend suspending or re- 
pealing the investment tax credit (ITC) because it appeared to be overheating 
the economy. At the presidents’ recommendation, we had twice repealed and 
subsequently reenacted the investment tax credit. 
But I was not prepared for the series of events that transpired during the next 
few weeks. When the first stage-the  5 percent tax cut-went  into effect in 
October 1981, the stock market started going down rather than up. The econ- 
omy-which  had been booming since Ronald Reagan took office-turned 
downward. 
The economy was on its way into a recession. Why? It was explained to me 
this way.  First, various gurus and economic thinkers on Wall Street such as 
Henry Kaufman thought that the massive tax cuts would lead to huge deficits. 
Second, they believed that the huge deficits would be inflationary. Third, they 
reasoned that the inflation would require high interest rates. And, fourth, they 
concluded that the high interest rates would make it impractical to build the 
new plants and equipment on which we were relying. 
This would prevent the economic boom that we had predicted. Their logic 
was compelling. By my lights, that was not a difficult problem to overcome. It 
was my  view that the president should be persuaded to “stretch out” the tax 
cuts as long as need be. That should restore confidence  and achieve the desired 
degree of economic expansion. 
When I explained my  theory to Republican Senator Bob Dole, the new 
chairman of the Finance Committee, he suggested that the two of us should 
call on President Reagan so that I could explain my suggestion. (Incidentally, 
I was not alone in this thinking. Charls Walker was reported to be thinking 
along the same lines. He will tell you  that there were a lot of  other highly 
regarded advisers of President Reagan’s who agreed.) 
The president received us graciously, but, when I tried to explain my recom- 
mendation, Ronald Reagan took over the conversation, and I hardly had a 
chance to get more than a few words in edgewise. Ronald Reagan was deter- 
mined to stay the course. And he did. 
Then, after a few months, we saw the deficit getting out of hand. I was in- 223  Tax Policy 
vited to sit with what was later known as “the Gang of Seventeen.” We  were 
asked to recommend revenue increases and spending cuts that could lead us to 
a balanced budget. The Gang of Seventeen failed because then Speaker “Tip” 
O’Neill (ably represented by Dick Boland) would not agree to cut back on 
Social Security-not  even the cost-of-living adjustment (commonly referred 
to as the COLA). 
If  you were not going to cut in the area of  Social Security, then it made 
no sense to cut in the smaller entitlement areas like government retirement, 
railroad retirement, and other lesser entitlement programs. For lack of sav- 
ings in the entitlement areas, the Reagan administration was not interested in 
pushing for a “budget-balancing” package that had no hope of balancing the 
budget. 
Without the spending cuts, Ronald Reagan was not willing to advocate-or 
sign into law-the  tax increases that he would have considered under other 
circumstances. So the tax suggestions went down the drain with the spending 
cuts. 
Thereafter, as responsible Americans far and wide spoke out for a tax in- 
crease, Bob Dole seized the initiative and put together TEFRA, the Tax EQuity 
and Fiscal Responsibility Act. This was heralded as a measure to close tax 
loopholes and achieve greater tax uniformity. 
It was a significant  tax increase, and it became law. Bob Dole’s TEFRA took 
away from business about half the benefit of Ronald Reagan’s ERTA bill. 
Meanwhile, we passed a five-cent tax increase on gasoline. Then came the 
Social Security Rescue Package. This measure found ways to shift more gen- 
eral revenues into the Social Security fund. It made the Social Security fund 
solvent temporarily by adding to the national debt. 
The more logical part of the Social Security package was that, in future 
years, the Social Security taxes were to be increased to bring in more revenue. 
A couple of years later, the deficit-reduction package repealed most of  what 
was left for business in ERTA. Neither of those bills touched the rates. Now 
add all that together, and you have a lot of tax increases. 
Then came the so-called Tax Reform Act of 1986. It took away a great num- 
ber of  deductions and used the revenue to reduce the rates. Much was said 
about the fact that 7 million relatively low-income taxpayers were removed 
from the rolls. However, the big item of controversy was the repeal of capital 
gains. 
In general terms, we reduced taxes for about 70 percent of individual  taxpay- 
ers and sought to make it back by  raising taxes on corporations. That latter 
objective, paying for the individual tax reductions by increasing taxes on cor- 
porations, was not achieved-not  in full at least. 
The reason was that corporations found ways to reduce tax liabilities-such 
as obtaining capital by borrowing money rather than by selling stock. This led 
to very thin margins of  equity in some corporations. That, in turn,  made com- 
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The lower rates had to do a lot of good. But much of that good was merely 
by terminating the stifling effect of income tax rates that were too high. 
Well, here we are. We are still stuck with a capital gains tax on transactions 
many of which are not income at all  in a real sense. We have had very large 
deficits for every year after the ERTA tax cut went into effect. 
And, after ten years under Presidents Reagan and Bush, the debt, as a per- 
centage of the GNP, is now back to where it was toward the end of the Eisen- 
hower administration. In terms of fiscal and monetary prudence, America has 
lost the ground it gained under Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. 
We have a situation that must be turned around. It will take time. But eventu- 
ally the people will learn that to put our income tax rates much higher than we 
have now is self-defeating.  It stifles the economy and retards economic growth. 
If  large amounts of additional revenue are needed, we should turn to a tax 
on consumption, as our friends in Europe have done. That may take several 
years to do, but it will happen because it makes sense. 
Summary of Discussion 
Murray Weidenbaum began the discussion by agreeing with Walker that politi- 
cians of one party can change policy in a way that politicians of the other party 
often cannot. He recalled that President Reagan was considering whether to 
include in his initial tax proposal a recommendation to lower the top tax 
bracket from 70 to 50 percent, and he asked what the response to that recom- 
mendation would be. His advisers said that the Democrats would lambaste 
them as the party of the rich, but, if this recommendation were not included in 
the administration proposal, then they likely would put it in themselves be- 
cause it is a good idea. Reagan said that he would let the Democrats twist his 
arm  and then reluctantly go along with it, which is what Weidenbaum believed 
had actually happened. Weidenbaum added that one fundamental flaw with the 
Joint Tax  Committee’s revenue estimates is that they were static; in other 
words, a tax change designed to quicken the growth rate is estimated to have 
no effect on revenue through a faster growth rate. 
Rudolph Penner thought it was interesting that neither Walker nor Long 
made any mention of the journalistic crusade of the supply-siders in the late 
1970s and early 1980s as an important factor in the original tax cuts. 
Churls Walker responded that the role of the extreme supply-siders was 
overplayed by  the press. The basic economic policy group around Ronald 
Reagan during the 1980 campaign was not economists Arthur Laffer and Jude 
Wanniski but rather George Shultz [former secretary of the treasury and later 
secretary of  state], Arthur Burns [former chairman of  the Federal Reserve 
Board], Alan Greenspan [former chairman of the Council of Economic Advis- 225  Tax Policy 
ers and later chairman of the Federal Reserve Board], economist Milton Fried- 
man, Walter Wriston [chairman of Citicorp], Jim Lynn [former director of the 
Office of Management and Budget], Representative Jack Kemp, and Walker 
himself. This team felt “almost to a man” (Kemp excluded) that the Kemp- 
Roth tax cut of “10-10-10”  should be extended at least over a five-year period 
instead of a three-year period. Someone wrote Reagan’s speech at the Republi- 
can convention to include the phrase “three-year cut.” But the economic policy 
group met less than three weeks later in Los Angeles, and Greenspan told 
Reagan that it would be much easier to reach the goal of reducing both spend- 
ing and taxes to 18-20  percent of GNP after five years if they could extend the 
Kemp-Roth plan from three years to five years. Reagan said, “I don’t care,” and 
they all “nearly fell out of their chairs.” 
Thereafter there was debate within the group, with Kemp on one side and 
most of the other members on the other side. They were moving toward back- 
ing away from the three-year approach when Reagan got into trouble talking 
about some other issues, and the economic policy group decided (in putting 
together an economic policy speech after Labor Day) that they couldn’t back 
away. But the basic idea of the economic plan constructed by this group was 
not that the tax cuts would pay for themselves but that there had to be a con- 
comitant cut in the rate of growth of federal spending. The press played it up 
as purely a “supply-side off a napkin thing,” even though Laffer was not even 
a participant in the deliberations. 
Weidenbaum noted  that  Laffer was  on the economic policy  group, but 
Walker stated that Laffer either did not attend or did not say anything. Martin 
Feldstein added that William Roth had been talking about a “10-10-10”  tax 
cut for quite a number of years before Roth had ever heard of Laffer or supply- 
side economics. 
Robert Litan said his understanding was that Laffer and other supply-siders 
had had a major intellectual influence on Kemp. Since Walker indicated that 
Kemp was on the panel and was staunchly defending the three-year rather than 
the five-year program, the role of the suppler-siders  should not be understated. 
Walker confirmed that it was Kemp who had the reference to a three-year plan 
included in Reagan’s speech. 
Russell Long  addressed the question of President Reagan’s political motiva- 
tion for supporting tax reform in the mid-1980s. Long felt that Senator Bill 
Bradley and others were attracting a lot of publicity by talking about tax fair- 
ness and tax reform and that it looked as though it might be a problem for the 
Republican party if  the Democrats made much headway on the issue. Also, 
some of the Republicans on the Senate Finance Committee were interested in 
tax reform, so it seemed to Long that Reagan decided that he ought to “get out 
front” on the issue. Long believed that, when a politician thinks some legisla- 
tion is going to pass, it is often better to “bend with the wind and go along” 
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law, then things could happen that would hurt the people one is represent- 
ing. He always felt that, after the storm had passed, people would decide to 
restore special capital gains tax provisions in order to encourage economic 
growth. 
Weidenbaum said that the decision made in January 1984 to encourage tax 
reform was a political decision based on fear on the part of James Baker White 
House chief of staff] and others that Democratic presidential candidate Walter 
Mondale would join the flat tax bandwagon of  Bradley and Representative 
Dick Gephardt. Thus, the president said a few lines in his State of the Union 
message that directed the secretary of the Treasury to undertake a study and 
report back in December 1984. In fact, Reagan had no great relish for tax 
reform except for lower tax rates. 
David Stockman discussed several crucial facts that he believed ruled tax 
policy for most of the 1980s. First, as late as early 1981, a 30 percent tax rate 
cut had a very small constituency in Congress. There was no great support for 
it in the Democratic party, and, even in the Republican party, only a minority 
of the “backbenchers” like Kemp and Stockman were in favor of it. Neverthe- 
less, the policy was being developed at a time when the inflation rate was run- 
ning at 10  or 11 percent, and there was a group of more orthodox members of 
Congress who saw the 10-10-10  tax cut as simply a politically attractive form 
of  temporary indexing. Stockman remembered Alan Greenspan making the 
argument strongly to the skeptical middle-of-the-road Republicans that a 10 
percent rate cut in this environment was basically going to keep the real tax 
rates constant, so they would not be taking a major fiscal risk. 
What happened in reality was that the monetary policy being implemented 
at the same time lowered inflation dramatically faster than anybody expected, 
so that, by the fall of 1983, the inflation rate was running about 3 percent on 
an annual basis. As a result, the 10-10-10  tax cut became a far deeper fiscal 
cut in terms of the real revenue base of government. 
Second, since there was not a strong constituency for this tax change in the 
Republican party, when the fight really got serious in committee, a compro- 
mise had to be made between the middle-of-the-road tax indexers and the 
supply-side rate cutters. To get the tax bill out of the Senate Finance Commit- 
tee, it had to be agreed that there would be a vote on the Senate floor about 
indexing. Stockman remembered Senator Bob Dole saying that the indexing 
provision would be easily defeated on the floor and that this is the way we can 
get an 18-to-3 committee vote in favor of the bill before it went to the floor. 
However, indexing passed, and the unexpectedly large real rate cut in 1981-83 
was locked in permanently in 1985 by the indexing. 
The revenue impact of indexing was far beyond what anybody expected. 
Today, people are always looking at five-year budget projections, and the natu- 
ral question is why didn’t anybody think about the long-term revenue impact 
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almost everybody looked at one-year budget projections, and nobody took five- 
year projections seriously. 
The third crucial fact is that, even with indexing and the rate cut, the tax bill 
would not have passed in 1981 unless all the other tax policy constituencies 
were accommodated.  So the 10-5-3  capital depreciation schedule was married 
to the bill, the estate tax was dismantled over four or five years, there were 
huge savings and IRA  incentives included, anything that the oil and gas indus- 
try could imagine was added, and so on. The tax bill that was signed into law 
in 198  1, under the economic conditions that actually materialized by 1986, cut 
the revenue base by  5 percent of GNP when the back-loaded features of the 
bill were fully in force. So, in August 1981, the government cut a gaping 5 
percent of  GNP hole in its revenue base, bringing it down to 17 percent of 
GNP. This was relative to spending of 23 or 24 percent of  GNP under the 
defense and domestic policy conditions of the time. 
Stockman  recapitulated his view that everything that happened to tax policy 
after 1981 was driven by the near impossibility of our political system coping 
with a 5 percent of GNP hole in the fiscal balance. The hole was slowly closed 
in  the 1982 act, the 1983 act, and the 1984 act, so, by  the time they got to 
1986, the hole was only 4 percent rather than 5 percent. However, it was that 
fundamental, shocking imbalance that drove almost the whole economic and 
fiscal policy story, in Stockman’s view, in the 1980s. 
Feldstein noted that Stockman’s calculation of a revenue loss of 5 percent of 
GNP was a static estimate with no behavioral response because it was based 
on the economy as it actually worked out. The supply-siders  would argue that, 
without that tax cut, there would have been less GNP growth and thus less 
revenue, so the actual cut is smaller than the 5 percent. Stockman and Feldstein 
agreed that the actual cut was not much smaller, however. 
William Poole commented that the unexpectedly rapid decline in inflation 
was importantly affected by  the unexpected appreciation of  the dollar. He 
thought that this appreciation had been a result of three separate factors. First, 
monetary policy became substantially more disciplined, and expectations of 
inflation and actual inflation came down. Second, economies abroad turned 
much weaker than expected. Most people did not foresee the Latin American 
debt crisis a couple of years in advance, and the European economies turned 
soft as well. Finally, the investment incentives in the 1981 tax law increased 
the attractiveness of investment in the United States by increasing the after-tax 
rate of return, and this brought capital to the United States, which aided in the 
appreciation of the dollar. 
Penner questioned the emphasis on indexing as the cause of  so much lost 
revenue. Before indexing was in force, Congress regularly offset the extra in- 
flation tax by cutting tax rates, although not always the rates that affected the 
people who were hurt by  inflation. He thought that one of  the remarkable 
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pendulum that Walker discussed, the overall federal tax burden had been al- 
most a divine constant of between 18 and 20 percent of GNP. Every time the 
ratio had risen to 20 percent, there had been a reaction, and it had gone back 
down. 
Feldstein said that Penner’s point raised the question of whether there would 
have been discretionary tax cuts in the mid-l980s, despite the increasingly 
large budget deficits, if the indexing had not been in place. 
Feldstein recalled that he had debated the merits of the 10-10-10  tax cut as 
an approximation to indexing with Walker and others back in the late 1970s 
and had argued very much against it. There was no question that, given the 
inflation forecast of the time, the two proposals were approximately equal, but 
Feldstein thought that there was too much uncertainty about that forecast. He 
also liked the idea of indexing per se and instituting a permanently indexed 
system rather than accomplishing a one-time tax cut and then having inflation 
push people up into higher brackets again. 
Feldstein asked the group how indexing came to be an accepted idea. He 
remembered trying to persuade Representative Barber Conable of the virtue of 
indexing, and Conable visited Canada to see how indexing was working there 
and came back to say that it was terrible and that he was firmly opposed to 
the idea. Eventually, Conable was a big advocate of  indexing, and Feldstein 
wondered how that pendulum on indexing shifted and why it did not include 
capital gains or depreciation. 
Weidenbuum thought that William Fellner at the American Enterprise Insti- 
tute was instrumental in starting the discussion, not by directly influencing the 
media or Capitol Hill, but by  influencing the people who influence both the 
media and the Hill. 
Feldstein said that he and Fellner and a few others were part of a group that 
met with Conable occasionally when he was the ranking minority member of 
the Ways and Means Committee. When that group advocated indexing, how- 
ever, Conable was very resistant, and there was no general support for the idea. 
Stockman said that the more cynical explanation of the increased interest 
in indexing is the political fight in the Republican party between the young 
backbenchers and the middle-of-the-road traditional Republicans. People like 
Conable and Representative Bill Gradison repaired to indexing as an alterna- 
tive to a “radical, experimental, dangerous” 30 percent rate cut. The idea for 
indexing had been around for a long time, but this was the source of the politi- 
cal momentum. Long  said that, once people started asking about bracket creep 
before civic clubs and in similar settings, it was very hard to defend the other 
side. 
Feldstein asked why the indexing of capital gains was never accepted, even 
though it should be subject to the same kinds of arguments. Walker responded 
that the people who were pushing capital gains tax changes from the outside 
believed that they could get indexation almost any time because both sides of 
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indexing as the centerpiece of capital gains tax changes to the exclusion of a 
“real” differential capital gains cut. 
Feldstein returned to another topic raised by Stockman, the reason that so 
many additional items were added to the basic 10-10-10  tax cut. Feldstein 
contrasted Stockman’s argument that the only way to pass the tax cut was to 
add 10-5-3  depreciation and so on with Long’s argument that people felt that 
the tax cut would be approved so they might as well add a lot of other ideas 
that had been around. 
Long responded that there had been a similar situation about add-on argu- 
ments when they were working on the Kennedy tax cut bill in 1963 and 1964. 
At one point, they realized that they had added so much extra baggage on top 
of the investment tax credit that they had to kill some of these extra provisions 
or abandon the bill. He thought that, if someone in the Reagan administration 
had “read the riot act” to the right group in Congress, much of the objection- 
able language could have been dumped out. 
Stockman explained that, while the administration bill was being consid- 
ered, there was an alternative bill emerging in the House (the Conable-Hance 
bill) that was an attempt to avoid a “competitive  political auction” on tax cuts. 
That was going to be a consensus bill that did not have all the cuts that the 
administration wanted but that would also not lead to a competitive bidding 
contest between the Democrats and the Republicans in the House. The White 
House was trying to decide whether to support the consensus bill, but they had 
just won the big fight on the budget on the House side (the Gramm-Latta bill), 
and they felt that they had the ability to push through their own bill and there- 
fore did not have to compromise. The Democrats were smarting badly at that 
point because they had just lost the first strategic level domestic policy fight in 
the Congress in thirty years (again, Gram-Latta), so they were not overly 
interested in compromising either. On 4 June 1981, the decision was made by 
the White House not to embrace the bipartisan Conable-Hance bill but to go 
for their own bill. The bill was loaded up in the House Ways and Means Com- 
mittee, and, by  the time it got to the floor, “everything that had ever been 
thought of  by  any tax constituency in the last thirty years” was in the bill. 
Because it happened in the House first, the Senate couldn’t help carrying the 
junk across the Capitol from the House into the Senate bill. 
Stockman felt that he had misspoken earlier by saying that these additions 
were needed to get a bill passed. The real explanation  is that the process turned 
into a competitive political auction, both bills were loaded with extra features, 
and there were “no shuckers to do the shucking” when the conference bill was 
put together because all the steps had been endorsed with huge votes in both 
houses. There are times when strategic decisions are made that affect the 
course of events, and to go for a competitive bill rather than a compromise in 
the House was the key decision made in early June 198  1. 
Hurry Reasoner argued that one of the most disastrous features of the 1981 
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allocation of capital, to vast overbuilding, to the savings and loan crisis, and to 
other  adverse economic impacts  throughout  our  economy.  He  wondered 
whether anyone at the time the legislation was passed believed there was an 
economic justification for it or whether anyone expressed concerns. 
Weidenbaum answered that the 1982 Economic Report of  the President in- 
cluded a table that showed the combined effects of the investment tax credit 
and 10-5-3  depreciation  rules producing negative tax  rates on some assets, but 
that was after the fact. 
Stockman argued that there was a strong case for encouraging plant and 
equipment investment and that the powerful real estate lobby simply jumped 
into the action. So 10-5-3  was really a marriage of convenience between a 
powerful real estate lobby and the original case for accelerated depreciation of 
plant and equipment. 
Feldstein added that most public finance economists did not understand at 
the time how much the tax shelter industry could accomplish with the new tax 
law. Only after the fact did economists learn what the combination of extreme 
leverage (no cash in the deal) and those kinds of depreciation rates could 
produce. 
Walker thought that the revenue impact of these add-on provisions for the 
1981 tax act was being overstated. He thought that the three big revenue im- 
pacts were the personal income rate cut (10-10-lo),  the new  depreciation 
schedule (10-5-3),  and the indexing of personal tax  rates. The 10-5-3  cut was 
married to the  10-10-10  cuts as a compromise between those who defined 
supply-side tax cuts solely in terms of individual tax cuts and those who said 
that capital cost recovery is important in the business community. So those two 
items were what the Reagan task force recommended and basically what the 
Treasury Department eventually proposed. 
Geoxfey Carliner asked why the political system was unable to solve the 
problems in the 1980s that it had been able to solve before. In other words, 
why was it unable to restore the rough fiscal balance of previous decades? 
Feldstein responded that an important difference in the 1980s was indexing. 
Once indexing was on the books, there were not the automatic tax increases 
that had occurred in past decades. 
Long felt that, since President Reagan had led the charge for the big tax  cut, 
he did not relish the idea of  working to repeal some of the things he had 
proudly signed into law. Long understood that, commenting that Reagan had 
not had as much experience as Long had at reversing his position. Long joked 
that he had votedfor the investment tax credit three times and against it three 
times. He felt that flexibility is not a bad thing when the situation requires it. 
Weidenbaum said that he, Baker, and others had constructed a package of 
excise tax increases that Dole was going to introduce in early 1982. 
Stockman confirmed that the package was arranged in January 1982 because 
the administration was about to have to present the first $100 billion deficit in 
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print the budget, but the Chamber of  Commerce and the business lobbies 
fought the taxes, and they “died by noon.” The budget had to be printed that 
same afternoon, so they invented prospective management savings to reduce 
the budget deficit. Thy,  a triple-digit deficit is nothing, but in those days it 
was close to fiscal treason. 
The management savings were made up on the spot, but they had an im- 
portant legacy. They were ridiculed on the Hill until it came time to put the 
TEFRA (Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act) package and budget to- 
gether later in 1982. Then those savings were adopted as part of the “three-for- 
one” deal, in which there was supposed to be three dollars in spending cuts for 
every dollar in taxes raised by TEFRA. Those management savings were “out 
of this world” and could not have been achieved by  anybody, but, two years 
later, the president and the Republican right wing decided that Congress had 
engaged in a great act of treachery by adopting the TEFRA tax increases and 
not producing the expected spending cuts. These particular spending cuts were 
never real cuts anyway. This was another aspect of why the government could 
not deal with the 7 percent fiscal hole: after a while, people began to believe 
things that were not true about the opportunities for change that existed. 
William Niskanen said that, in the spring of 1981, many economists testified 
that the tax cuts would be wildly inflationary. This was the basis of the charge 
that the Reagan program was incoherent because, while monetary policy was 
presumed to reduce inflation, the tax cuts were presumed by  economists of 
both parties to be inflationary. 
Niskanen asked the group about two contingent tax proposals that did not 
pass. In June 1981, Representative Jim Jones, then head of the House Budget 
Committee, proposed that the third year of the tax cut be made contingent on 
Stockman  delivering on his $44  billion “magic asterisk.” Niskanen felt that this 
proposal was appealing from a public choice point of view because it provided 
a continuing incentive to both the administration  and Congress to agree on $44 
billion of  further spending cuts. Why did the administration reject this idea 
so abruptly? 
A different contingent tax proposal was suggested by the administration in 
the winter of  1983, in which they proposed a contingent tax increase if Con- 
gress made spending cuts. Niskanen thought that that was a bizarre proposal 
and wondered what its origin was. 
Feldstein responded that the conditional tax increase with which he was 
involved was in the budget that was submitted in early 1983. The supply-siders 
and others were forecasting so much economic growth that the deficit was 
going to go away, and they argued that, if taxes were raised in 1983, that would 
kill the recovery. So the president’s budget in the beginning of 1983 said that 
there would be a tax increase if  there was not sufficient growth in  1984 to 
shrink the deficit to whatever the targets were. But this proposal never had the 
support of Baker in the White House or of the Treasury, so it was never pushed 
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Stockman said that the conditional tax increase was proposed because it 
seemed unacceptable within  the  administration to  propose a  budget  that 
pointed the country toward the first permanent $200 billion budget deficit pol- 
icy. It was easy to describe the idea internally in the administration,  but, when 
the budget became public and reporters started asking about the contingent 
tax, nobody knew what it was. Sooner or later, someone said, maybe it’s a flat 
tax, and that became part of the vocabulary of the fiscal debate over the course 
of the year, and eventually, as Bradley and the flat-taxers turned up the heat, 
there was the Treasury study in early 1984. The administration  became hooked 
on the idea as a result of having to describe a contingent tax that was put in to 
help clean up the numbers but really had no content. 
Walker thought that Jim Baker and Richard Darman [deputy White House 
chief of staff] were deeply concerned about the deficit in the summer of  1984 
and earlier and wanted to do something about it. He said that Darman was 
accused in the campaign of 1984 of having a secret tax plan in the closet, and 
Walker believed that it was true. Walker believed that, if  Baker and Darman 
had stayed in the White House in the first year of Reagan’s second term, then 
there would have been serious consideration given to what Darman called a 
“big fix” on fiscal policy. However, Donald Regan was chief of staff in the 
White House by then, and he did not have a very good understanding of either 
the political or the economic issues involved. So the personality changes made 
a large increase in taxes (say 2 percent of GNP) absolutely impossible. Such 
an increase is not possible through nickel-and-dime  tax changes or through the 
income tax because the revenue from the income tax comes mainly at the ex- 
pense of the middle class, which is the driving political force in the country. 
The remaining possibility is a broad-based consumption tax, not just because 
it is a consumption tax, but because it raises so much revenue. 
Walker said that the politics of tax increases started to change when Walter 
Mondale told the Democratic Convention in August 1984 that both he and 
Reagan knew that taxes would have to be increased but that Mondale would 
say so and that Reagan would not. At his next press conference, Reagan said 
that he was against raising taxes until federal spending was down to the lowest 
possible level relative to GNP. In other words, he did not close the door to the 
idea. However, it became clear that Mondale had made a big political mistake, 
so, by the time the campaign ended, “no tax increase” had become dogma as 
far as the president, and later Regan, was concerned. Over the next several 
years, it became basic Republican policy. Walker felt that the United States 
now has a plebiscite democracy that is giving the people exactly what they 
want-low  taxes and high spending. 
James Poterba shifted the discussion to the distributional politics of the tax 
burden. Looking back over the decade, he was struck that the 1981 changes 
were very beneficial to those at the top of the income distribution and that the 
1983 Social Security reform moved in the same direction by putting higher tax 
burdens on low-income earners. However, if one consolidates the corporation 233  Tax Policy 
tax changes into the  1986 tax reform, that represents a reversal by  putting 
higher burdens on those at the top of the income distribution. And the 1990 
discussions of taxes on yachts, planes, and millionaires suggest that we have 
come full circle on this topic. 
Walker felt that the Democrats were now considering a strong populist ap- 
proach as a political strategy, in contrast with Stockman’s remark after the 1978 
tax act passed that the country is no longer concerned with how income is 
distributed but with how it is created. This partisan debate had received a big 
push in the previous three or four months as a result of the debate on the budget 
and the capital gains proposal. Walker also cited David Broder’s recent column 
on the Op-Ed page of the Washington  Post in which Broder said that the “fair- 
ness” issue would not work politically because the real concern of the Ameri- 
can people is not the taxes that rich people pay but the taxes that they pay them- 
selves. 
Long  agreed that tax rates should not be so high as to be counterproductive. 
He held that view in terms of the personal income tax as well as the corporate 
income tax, and he felt that the tax code should not go beyond the point at 
which it will really reduce economic activity. He believed that, as long as low- 
income people are doing better, middle-income people are doing better, and 
those in all walks of life are doing better, it is very important to keep accumu- 
lating capital and making investments. At some point we have to be in favor of 
creating more wealth even if it doesn’t come in with quite the distributional 
pattern we would like. This Page Intentionally Left Blank